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INTRODUCTION 
In October 2005, investors discovered that Refco, Inc., a popular 
brokerage firm, had for years engaged in fraudulent transactions designed 
to create a semblance of financial success.1  To cover up, rather than write 
off, poorly made loans that became uncollectible, Refco engaged in a series 
of complex “round-trip” transactions in which it made loans to third-parties 
and then had the third-parties make loans to its entities.2  As a result of this 
scheme, the appearance of Refco’s balance sheets improved dramatically.  
No one was the wiser when the company went public until months later 
when Refco stated that its balance sheets should not be relied upon.3  As it 
turned out, Refco’s financial situation, covered up by the fraud, left it on 
the precipice of collapse, which imminently followed,4 causing tremendous 
losses to investors and forcing Refco to declare bankruptcy.5 
In the course of its “round-trip” fraud, Refco used a well-known law 
firm to help it prepare key documents6 and explain the structure of the 
“round-trip” transactions to third-party participants in the scheme.7  The 
law firm was also involved in the creation of a series of securities offerings 
in which the prospectuses contained information that it knew to be false.8  
 
 1. In re Refco, Inc. Sec. Litig. (Refco I), 503 F. Supp. 2d 611, 620 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 2. In re Refco, Inc. Sec. Litig. (Refco II), 609 F. Supp. 2d 304, 306-07 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009). 
 3. Refco I, 503 F. Supp. 2d at 621. 
 4. See id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See Refco II, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 307-08. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 308-09. 
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Not surprisingly, investors sued the law firm claiming that it knew or 
should have known about the fraud, and thus ought to be held liable.9  The 
firm moved for dismissal.10  Granting the motion to dismiss, United States 
District Court Judge Lynch wrote that, given the present state of the law, he 
had no choice but to dismiss the action against the law firm.11  In dicta, 
however, Judge Lynch expressed his concern with the laws under which he 
had to decide the case, as well as his opinion that the system is ripe for a 
change so that such actions could, at a minimum, be heard in court.12 
Lawyers often play an integral part in business transactions and 
securities offerings.  This puts lawyers on the sidelines of not only great 
business successes, but also, every so often, tremendous failures.13  
Because they are viewed by many as gatekeepers, and in that role provide a 
degree of assurance (with their reputational capital) that gross illegalities 
will not occur,14 a series of questions arise in the minds of many when 
illegalities do happen on attorneys’ watch.15  This Note analyzes the legal 
standards that are in play and those that should be imposed when lawyers 
aid or abet a fraud. 
Part I sets out the historical and theoretical background against which 
the analysis of attorney liability is undertaken.  This Part traces the relevant 
underlying principles and defines the unique position that a lawyer 
 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 305. 
 11. Id. at 318-19. 
 12. Id. at 319 n.15. 
 13. See, e.g., Thomas Lee Hazen, Administrative Law Controls on Attorney Practice-A 
Look at the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Lawyer Conduct Rules, 55 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 323, 339 (2003) (“The role lawyers play in facilitating securities fraud, albeit 
unwittingly in many cases, should not be ignored.  This has been a recent concern of the 
roles lawyers play as a result of failures such as Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco.  However, 
this is not a new concern.”). 
 14. For a discussion on gatekeepers and attorneys as gatekeepers, see infra Part I.A.2. 
 15. “Where were the lawyers?” is a question that was once famously asked in Judge 
Sporkin's opinion in Lincoln Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Wall. 743 F. Supp. 901, 920 (D.D.C. 
1990) (“Where were these professionals. . . . Where were the . . . attorneys when these 
transactions were effectuated?”).  Today, this question has reached a near-classic status, and 
is frequently asked after major financial frauds. See, e.g., Accountability Issues: Lessons 
Learned from Enron’s Fall: Hearing Before the Sen. Judiciary Comm., 107th Cong. 38 
(2002) (statement of Susan P. Koniak, Professor of Law, Boston Univ. Sch. of Law) 
(addressing “Where were the Lawyers? Behind the Curtain Wearing Their Magic Caps”); 
Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judgment, Identity and Independence, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1, 3 
(2009) (“Whenever corporate or governmental scandals erupt, onlookers are quick to ask, 
‘Where were the lawyers?’”); Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A 
Behavioral Inquiry into Lawyers’ Responsibility for Clients’ Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75, 
76 (1993) (“Where were the lawyers? Perhaps rhetorical, even sarcastic, this question is 
being asked all too frequently after large financial frauds.”). 
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occupies under securities laws as he or she plays the dual role of client 
advocate and corporate gatekeeper.  It then discusses the changes to 
attorney liability that were brought about by judicial decisions and 
legislative actions over the past two decades.  Part II discusses the 
contrasting views on the issue, both those calling for the reintroduction of 
aiding and abetting liability and those calling for a continuation of the 
status quo.  Finally, Part III offers a new approach for resolving the debate, 
proposing a statutory amendment that balances competing policy 
considerations; specifically, the need for liability and the need to curb the 
potential explosion of litigation such liability may cause. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
The discussion that follows in this section provides the background 
information which forms the basis for the current debate on whether to 
impose aiding and abetting liability on attorneys.  Part I.A provides a brief 
overview of the ethical and professional rules governing attorneys’ conduct 
and then discusses attorneys’ status as gatekeepers.  Part I.B reviews the 
history of aiding and abetting liability in the United States prior to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First 
Interstate Bank of Denver.16  Part I.C discusses the limits placed on aiding 
and abetting liability by Central Bank and the following congressional 
expansion of such liability with the passage of Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995.17  Thereafter, Part I.D reviews the changes to 
attorneys’ gatekeeper role brought about by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
200218 in the wake of the Enron scandal, and Part I.E discusses the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-
Atlanta, Inc.19 and its elimination of scheme liability20—one of the options 
used by investors as an alternative to the overruled aiding and abetting 
liability claim.  Lastly, Part I.F discusses the congressional response to the 
Stoneridge decision and the frauds that accompanied the recent recession 
via the proposed bill entitled Liability for Aiding and Abetting Securities 
Violations Act of 2009.21 
 
 16. 511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
 17. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). 
 18. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 19. 552 U.S. 148 (2008). 
 20. For a definition and discussion of scheme liability, see infra Part I.E. 
 21. Liability for Aiding and Abetting Securities Violations Act of 2009, S. 1551, 111th 
Cong. (2009). 
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A. Cast in Dual Roles: The Role of the Lawyer 
Much of the impetus to impose aiding and abetting liability on lawyers 
stems from their gatekeeper role in securities law and corporate contexts,22 
and the belief that there is a need to ensure that they continue in that 
function.23  It is therefore helpful to begin the discussion of attorney aiding 
and abetting liability with an overview of the dual roles that lawyers play. 
As counsel, an attorney is both a corporate gatekeeper thereby 
possessing a set of responsibilities to the general public,24 and an advocate 
constrained by a duty to the client and responsibilities that come with client 
representations.25  The dual roles that attorneys play are governed by 
different standards.  On the one hand, attorneys must abide by professional 
rules governing their obligations to clients26 and the profession;27 on the 
other hand, they must meet certain expectations associated with their 
gatekeeper role.28  The attorney-client relationship is further complicated 
by an important interest at stake for the attorney: continued client 
representation and thereby continued financial benefit, which, in turn, is 
 
 22. For an overview of gatekeeper functions, see infra Part II.A.1.  Whether or not 
lawyers do, or should, play the gatekeeper role has been, and still is, widely debated. 
Compare John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning 
Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 353 (2004) [hereinafter Gatekeeper Failure] 
(urging the imposition of several client-monitoring responsibilities on lawyers as a result of 
their gatekeeper function), and Langevoort, supra note 15, at 79-80 (discussing lawyers’ 
gatekeeper position), with Jill E. Fisch & Kenneth M. Rosen, Symposium, Lessons from 
Enron, How did Corporate and Securities Law Fail? Is There a Role for Lawyers in 
Preventing Future Enrons?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1097, 1138 (2003) (arguing against the utility 
of imposing client-monitoring responsibilities on lawyers). 
 23. See, e.g., Gatekeeper Failure, supra note 22. 
 24. SEC v. Nat’l Student Mktg., 457 F. Supp. 682, 713 (D.D.C. 1978); see also Schware 
v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 353 U.S. 232, 247 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“From a 
profession charged with such responsibilities there must be exacted those qualities of truth-
speaking, of a high sense of honor, of granite discretion, of the strictest observance of 
fiduciary responsibility, that have, throughout the centuries, been compendiously described 
as ‘moral character.’”); Gatekeeper Failure, supra note 22. This responsibility is also 
imposed on lawyers by the less focal, but nonetheless important, ethical obligations as 
officers of the court. 
 25. Numerous rules and principals govern the attorney-client relationship. See infra Part 
I.A.1. These obligations to the client are of great importance, for instance, attorney-client 
privilege—one of such client obligations—is widely debated when the proposition of 
imposing gatekeeper liability on attorneys is discussed. See, e.g., Paul S. Atkins, The 
Preservation of the Age-Old Attorney-Client Privilege, 43 ADVOC. (TEX.) 20 (2008). 
 26. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2007) (imposing strict rules on 
attorneys with respect to confidential information obtained from their client in the course of 
representation); see also infra Part I.A.1. 
 27. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2007). 
 28. See, e.g., Gatekeeper Failure, supra note 22, at 309. 
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important for both a law firm’s reputational capital29 and its financial well-
being.  This goal of client retention, however, in spite of its benefits,30 can 
impair an attorney’s judgment of what is ethically necessary,31 increasing 
the need for appropriately tailored rules governing attorney conduct. 
1. Professional Rules Governing Attorney Conduct 
Many of the existing ethical and professional principles that guide 
attorney behavior are reflected in the American Bar Association Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct (the “Rules”), which have been adopted in 
one form or another in over forty states.32  These and other attorney 
conduct rules take into account attorneys’ dual roles and contain guidelines 
designed to help attorneys meet both obligations to their clients and any 
obligations they may have to the public as a result of their clients’ actions.  
The main obligation of a lawyer, however, is the one owed to the client, 
which the Rules reflect through their explicit imposition of such duties.33  
By contrast, the obligation to the public is more theoretical and stems from 
general ethical principles rather than specific relationships.34 
Because of the overarching significance of the duty to the client, any 
outside obligations that may conflict with this duty inevitably complicate 
client representation.  In the case of gatekeeper obligations, the chief 
complicating factor, apart from the duty of confidentiality, is the doctrine 
 
 29. Continued representation and growing experience are key to growing reputational 
capital, and therefore becoming a more popular firm and desirable gatekeeper. See, e.g., id. 
at 308-11.  For a discussion on the value of reputational capital to securities attorneys, see 
Karl S. Okamoto, Reputation and the Value of Lawyers, 74 OR. L. REV. 15, 18-19 (1995). 
 30. Such benefits may include increased client loyalty, quality of performance and 
diligence, as well as increased performance efficiency. 
 31. See Deborah L. Rhode & Paul D. Paton, Lawyers, Ethics, and Enron, 8 STAN. J.L. 
BUS. & FIN. 9, 26 (2002) (“Increased competition from within and outside the bar has led to 
increased pressure on firms to favor responsiveness to client demands over broader societal 
concerns.  Allegiance to management’s short-term financial interests may compromise 
obligations to the broader public, as well as to the entity itself, which is, at least in theory, 
the lawyer’s client.”). 
 32. See ABA/BNA LAWYERS’ MANUAL ON PROF’L CONDUCT § 1:3 (2006) (setting forth 
details on every state). 
 33. For instance, ABA Model Rule 1.6 forbids a lawyer from disclosing confidential 
information except with the client’s informed consent. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
R. 1.6 (2007).  The comment to Model Rule 1.3 states that a lawyer must protect a client’s 
interests despite “opposition, obstruction or personal inconvenience to the lawyer.” MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. (2007). 
 34. See, e.g., Richard W. Painter & Jennifer E. Duggan, Lawyer Disclosure of 
Corporate Fraud: Establishing a Firm Foundation, 50 SMU L. REV. 225 (1996).  There 
does, however, exist a concrete duty to a known third party beneficiary. See, e.g., Stephen 
Gillers, Virtual Clients: An Idea in Search of a Theory (With Limits), 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 
797, 820-21 (2008). 
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of attorney-client privilege.35  The purpose of the doctrine is to protect 
communications between clients and their attorneys in the course of legal 
counseling, thus fostering more open communication.36  The privilege, 
however, is deemed waived upon disclosure of protected information that is 
not meant for the general public,37 which, in turn, also raises concerns for 
client confidentiality.38  Absent an exception, in the fulfillment of his or her 
gatekeeper obligations, the lawyer is restricted to avenues not involving 
disclosure.  To allow for circumstances where attorneys may need to reveal 
certain information, and to spare attorneys from necessary noncompliance 
with their broader ethical obligations, the Rules allow for disclosure in 
cases where it is necessary in order to “prevent the client from committing 
a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to 
the financial interests or property of another, and in furtherance of which 
the client has used or is using the lawyer’s services.”39  The duty to the 
client thus comes with exceptions that assist attorneys in their functions as 
officers of the court and gatekeepers, in addition to their advocate role. 
Although attorneys’ obligations to their clients are paramount, their 
obligations to third parties do not lack significance.  The Restatement 
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers recommends that a lawyer be 
“subject to liability to a client or nonclient when a nonlawyer would be in 
similar circumstances”40 and suggests the existence of and need for 
imposing aiding and abetting liability.41  Against this thematic backdrop, 
the Rules require a degree of attorney attention to possible client 
 
 35. For an overview of attorney-client privilege in corporate context, see ATTORNEY-
CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN CIVIL LITIGATION: PROTECTING AND DEFENDING CONFIDENTIALITY 
(Vincent S. Walkowiak ed., 2004); PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, CORPORATE DISCLOSURE 
AND ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE (Dennis J. Block & Jerold S. Solovy eds., 1984). 
 36. See generally Developments in the Law—Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. 
REV. 1450, 1501-29 (1985) (outlining rationales for the attorney-client privilege). 
 37. Id. at 1515. 
 38. Once waived, all information conveyed to counsel by the client is subject to 
disclosure. But see William H. Simon, After Confidentiality: Rethinking the Professional 
Responsibilities of the Business Lawyer, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1453, 1471 (2006) (arguing 
that lawyers should catch up with the current reality of business representation and adopt a 
less formalistic take on confidentiality). 
 39. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2) (2007). 
 40. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 56 (2000). 
 41. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 94 (2000) (providing 
limitations on attorney assistance to a client, particularly prohibiting assistance of client 
action that may be fraudulent, and explicitly providing for liability if an attorney assists a 
client in activity that may violate the rights of third parties). 
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misconduct,42 and set forth guidelines that prohibit attorney participation in 
fraud.  For instance, Rule 1.2(d) urges that a lawyer not assist a client in 
fraudulent conduct,43 and by its text suggests a prohibition on aiding and 
abetting a fraud; Rule 1.13(b) requires that an attorney report to higher 
authorities when the lawyer knows that a corporate employee is acting or 
plans to act unlawfully;44 and Rule 4.1 prohibits knowingly making false 
statements to third parties.45  These Rules are not meant to be an exhaustive 
checklist for attorney behavior, and the “Scope of the Rules” section 
provides that a certain degree of personal judgment and ethical 
consideration must also come into play because “no worthwhile human 
activity can be completely defined by legal rules.”46  This notion is further 
echoed in the preamble to the Rules, which explicitly states that in the 
practice of law, apart from the guidance set forth in the Rules, a “lawyer 
[should] also [be] guided by personal conscience.”47 
This panoply of rules and guiding principles suggests that a fairly high 
level of professional ethical expectations is in place, which is consistent 
with the goal of preventing attorney aiding and abetting of securities 
fraud.48  All else aside, “an attorney’s loyalty [to the client] is subject to the 
 
 42. The Rules, however, do not impose a duty to investigate a client. See Report of the 
New York City Bar Association Task Force on the Lawyer’s Role in Corporate Governance, 
62 BUS. LAW. 427, 453 (2007) [hereinafter Task Force Report]. 
 43. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2007) (“A lawyer shall not 
counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or 
fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of 
conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to 
determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.”). 
 44. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2007) (“Unless the lawyer 
reasonably believes that it is not necessary in the best interest of the organization to do so, 
the lawyer shall refer the matter to higher authority in the organization, including, if 
warranted by the circumstances, to the highest authority that can act on behalf of the 
organization as determined by applicable law.”).  Under this rule, the obligations stem only 
from misconduct “related to [the lawyer’s] representation.” Id.  Importantly, the premise 
underlying this rule is that the lawyer represents the organization, and therefore has to 
protect the organization and its shareholders from harm, rather than individual agents of the 
corporations or directors. 
 45. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (2007).  Rule 1.0(f) defines “knowingly” 
as having actual knowledge.  Furthermore, knowledge may be “inferred from 
circumstances” according to the rules. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0(f) (2007). 
 46. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (2007). 
 47. Id.  This appeal to ethical guidance from outside the text of the Rules does not end 
with the preamble and continues in the Rules themselves.  For instance, Rule 2.1 states that 
in the course of advising a client “a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other 
considerations such as moral, economic, [and other] factors” to the extent they are relevant 
in the situation. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2006). 
 48. Note, however, that the Model Rules do not impose on the attorney a duty to 
investigate the client if the attorney suspects client wrongdoing. Task Force Report, supra 
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overriding general norm, in both ethics and law, that lawyers must not 
knowingly give substantial assistance to client fraud.”49 
2. Attorneys as Gatekeepers 
In addition to their professional obligations, both to their clients and the 
public, attorneys also act as corporate gatekeepers.  The gatekeeper role has 
been defined in different ways.  Originally, a gatekeeper was conceived to 
be someone who was in a position to stop a given fraudulent, or otherwise 
legally problematic, transaction.50  The definition was later refined, and a 
corporate gatekeeper is now understood to be someone who serves as a 
reputational intermediary between the issuer and the public.51  Under this 
new definition, the gatekeeper fulfills its role by staking its own 
reputational capital as a form of assurance to the investing public of the 
quality of their investments.52  Because a gatekeeper does not stand to gain 
as much financially as the issuer, but risks a substantial decline in 
reputational capital, a gatekeeper would be less likely to violate or assist in 
violating the law.53  As a result, investors rely on the gatekeeper and expect 
that the gatekeeper will not risk overlooking fraud or other misconduct for 
fear of losing its hard-earned reputational capital.54  In other words, 
 
note 42.  Accordingly, an attorney’s knowledge of a client’s involvement in fraud would 
seem to have to come from the course of the attorney’s work, rather than from any kind of 
independent investigation after a proverbial red flag has been uncovered. But see 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §7.01 cmt. D (2006) (noting that an agent may have a 
duty to inquire further into information provided by the principal in “circumstances that 
make it unreasonable to rely on the information provided without further inquiry”); Roger 
C. Cramton, Enron and the Corporate Lawyer: A Primer on Legal and Ethical Issues, 58 
BUS. LAW. 143, 152 (2002) (“Probably the most unsettled and controverted question is 
whether a lawyer must investigate suspicious circumstances that suggest fraud or follow on 
the allegations of fraud.”). 
 49. Langevoort, supra note 15, at 78; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. 
(2007). 
 50. Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement 
Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 53 (1986) (defining gatekeepers as “private parties who 
are able to disrupt misconduct by withholding their cooperation from wrongdoers”). 
 51. For an overview of the gatekeeper concept and relevant literature, see JOHN C. 
COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 1-4 (2006) 
[hereinafter COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS]; Gatekeeper Failure, supra note 22, at 308-09. 
 52. See, e.g., COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 51, at 2 (“[A gatekeeper] is an agent 
who acts as a reputational intermediary to assure investors as to the quality of the ‘signal’ 
sent by the corporate issuer.”); Aegis J. Frumento, Misrepresentations of Secondary Actors 
in the Sale of Securities: Does In Re Enron Square with Central Bank?, 59 BUS. LAW. 975, 
977 (2005) (describing gatekeepers’ reputational intermediary function). 
 53. See, e.g., COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 51, at 5. 
 54. Gatekeeper Failure, supra note 22, at 308-09. 
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gatekeepers are expected to either stop the fraud, or at a minimum, not 
participate in it. 
Lawyers act as gatekeepers alongside other professionals, such as 
accountants, auditors, brokers, and other actors.55  As a gatekeeper, by 
placing its name on a transaction or document, a reputable law firm56 often 
dispels whatever degree of insecurity that an investor might otherwise feel.  
The firm’s name and reputation provide investors with assurance that the 
firm would all but guarantee the legality of the transaction.  This assurance 
is important since attorneys’ clients—the issuing corporations—are likely 
prone to more risk-taking than the lawyers because they usually have a 
substantially greater financial interest at stake.57  Because a law firm 
typically derives only a small percentage of its business from any given 
client, it is capable of being a functional gatekeeper.  Withdrawal as 
counsel from one client would not be financially fatal to the firm, thus 
simplifying the choice between the loss of one client and greater loss of 
reputational capital. 
B. The World Before Central Bank 
Aider and abettor liability is neither a novel nor a recent concept in the 
United States.  In fact, criminal liability has been imposed on aiders and 
abettors of federal crimes in the United States for over one hundred years.58  
Aiding and abetting liability also has a history in the civil law context.  For 
example, the Restatement (Second) of Torts instructs that such liability 
 
 55. Gatekeeper Failure, supra note 22.  Not everyone agrees, however, that casting 
lawyers in the gatekeeper role is appropriate. See, e.g., COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 
51, at 192 (“[T]he concept has never truly been accepted by the organized bar, which prefers 
to view the attorney as an advocate, whose sole duty is the zealous representation of the 
client.”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About The Gatekeepers, Stupid,” 
57 BUS. LAW. 1403, 1406-19 (2002) [hereinafter Coffee, Understanding Enron] (discussing 
gatekeepers’ role and the role of attorneys); Fisch & Rosen, supra note 22 (arguing that 
attorneys should not serve as corporate gatekeepers). 
 56. Almost exclusively the law firms chosen to represent the transactions of public 
companies and oversee their affairs are elite.  These firms are chosen not necessarily 
because of their superior service over lesser known or smaller firms, but because the 
reputation of these firms provides a reputational capital guarantee. See, e.g., Okamoto, supra 
note 29, at 37. 
 57. COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 51, at 5 (“Because the gatekeeper is inherently an 
agent of its principal, its expected fee or commission is likely to be far less than the gain that 
the principal itself expects to make from the transaction.”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Can 
Lawyers Wear Blinders? Gatekeepers and Third-Party Opinions, 84 TEX. L. REV. 59, 71 
(2005) [hereinafter Coffee, Can Lawyers Wear Blinders?]. 
 58. See 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1909).  In fact, such liability extends even further back in time to 
English criminal law of the eighteenth century. See 1 M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 615 
(1736). 
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would attach to one who “knows that the other’s conduct constitutes a 
breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the 
other.”59 
Securities law embodied such liability under its own statutory scheme, 
namely Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193460 (the “’34 
Act”) and Rule 10b-5,61 promulgated under its authority.62  Indeed, until 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First 
Interstate Bank of Denver63 such liability routinely attached to accountants, 
attorneys, underwriters, banks, and others64 in every federal circuit.65  
Although securities statutes and regulations do not explicitly include aiding 
and abetting liability,66 “courts quickly adopted the position that to further 
the ’34 Act’s basic philosophy . . . private parties, as well as governmental 
entities could impose liability under Section 10(b) on those who do no 
more than aid and abet violations of that section.”67  This judicial 
presumption is in line with the view that the writers of the ’34 Act 
 
 59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1977).  In practice, civil aiding and 
abetting liability existed primarily in securities regulation and labor law contexts. Eugene J. 
Schiltz, Civil Liability for Aiding and Abetting: Should Lawyers Be “Privileged” to Assist 
Their Clients’ Wrongdoing?, 29 PACE L. REV. 75, 84 (2008).  For a discussion of the history 
of aiding and abetting liability, see id. at 80-85. 
 60. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. §78j (2000).  The statutory text 
states: 
[It is] unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, . . . [t]o use or employ, in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or 
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as 
the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or 
for the protection of investors. 
Id. 
 61. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006). 
 62. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21, 15 U.S.C. § 78u (2002).  The authority 
granted to the SEC to promulgate rules also gave it enforcing authority. Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 78-79 (2006). 
 63. 511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
 64. See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 760 (6th 
ed. 2009) (noting that aiding and abetting was “itself a violation” of Section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5 for three decades preceding Central Bank). 
 65. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 192 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that in “hundreds of 
judicial and administrative proceedings in every Circuit in the federal system” courts and 
the SEC found aiding and abetting liability); see also Celia R. Taylor, Breaking the Bank: 
Reconsidering Central Bank of Denver After Enron and Sarbanes-Oxley, 71 MO. L. REV. 
367, 370 (2006) (“From the time Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 came into being in the 1930s 
until the mid-1990s, federal courts uniformly recognized a private cause of action for aiding 
and abetting under Section 10(b), the general anti-fraud provision of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934.”). 
 66. See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 184. 
 67. Taylor, supra note 65. 
ADAMS_CHRISTENSEN 10/13/2010  6:50 PM 
964 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVII 
presupposed that such liability would attach because the law at that time 
recognized accomplice liability for mere participation in a fraud, making 
inclusion of a provision that would explicitly impose such liability 
redundant.68  Recognition of aiding and abetting liability, both before and 
after the passage of the ’34 Act, has therefore been on our books and part 
of our legal history for many decades preceding Central Bank. 
C. Central Bank and the Congressional Response it Prompted 
Against this backdrop, coming on the heels of an aiding and abetting 
litigation explosion,69 the Supreme Court decided Central Bank,70 
eliminating such liability and substantially changing the legal landscape.  
Central Bank involved claims arising out of bond offerings made by the 
Colorado Springs-Stetson Hill Public Building Authority (the “Authority”) 
in 1986 and 1988 for which Central Bank of Denver served as the indenture 
trustee.71  The bond covenants required that the bonds be secured by real 
estate having an appraised value of at least 160% of the outstanding 
principal and interest.72  The first offering occurred without a problem.73  
Thereafter, although the real estate market in Colorado experienced a 
decline, the appraisal of the collateral for the second offering indicated that 
the value had remained essentially unchanged.74  Central Bank decided that 
an independent appraisal was necessary, but before any independent review 
came to pass, the Authority defaulted on the bonds and the purchaser of 
 
 68. Robert A. Prentice, Stoneridge, Securities Fraud Litigation, and the Supreme Court, 
45 AM. BUS. L.J. 611, 622-30 (2008) (discussing the role of aiding and abetting in the ’34 
Act’s drafters’ time and the understanding that it would attach, and noting that “[i]t is 
undeniable that, given the state of the law in 1934, a Congress contemplating a private right 
of action absolutely must have expected liability to be visited upon [aider and abettor] 
defendants”).  A review of cases predating the ’34 Act suggests that this judicial treatment 
of the Act is an extension of a then-existing presumption that aiding and abetting liability 
would attach and is not merely the result of an independent inquiry into the legislative intent 
of the ’34 Act’s drafters. See, e.g., Lewis v. McClure, 16 P.2d 166, 171 (Cal. 1932) (holding 
that fraud liability can be imposed upon each defendant shown to have participated in the 
fraud); Purdum v. Edwards, 141 A. 550, 553 (Md. 1928) (participants in deceit playing 
different roles are held jointly liable); Frank Shepard Co. v. Zachary P. Taylor Publ’g Co., 
198 A.D. 638, 190 N.Y.S. 837, 840 (App. Div. 1921) (holding participation to be the 
standard for fraud liability); Hotaling v. A.B. Leach & Co., 214 N.Y.S. 452, 458 (Mun. Ct. 
1926) (holding all promoters, officers, and directors who participated in preparing and 
circulating a corporation’s false prospectus liable, including the man who was the “moving 
spirit” behind circulation). 
 69. Schiltz, supra note 59, at 85. 
 70. 511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
 71. Id. at 167. 
 72. See id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
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two million dollars in bonds sued.75  The suit alleged that Central Bank of 
Denver had aided and abetted the Authority’s fraudulent scheme by failing 
to obtain an accurate appraisal of the collateral.76 
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, read the text of the ’34 Act 
strictly and interpreted it not to include a private right of action for aiding 
and abetting fraud.77  In its analysis, the Court noted that the particular 
words “aid” and “abet” did not appear in the text of the ’34 Act and 
rejected the SEC’s argument that the phrase “directly or indirectly” in 
Section 10(b) of the ’34 Act indicated Congressional intent to include 
aiding and abetting liability.78  The Court employed the classic argument 
that Congress knew how to articulate its wishes, and the absence of explicit 
text indicates the absence of that specific intent.79 
Not everyone agrees with the Court’s understanding of the meaning of 
the statute’s words.80  A counter-argument to the Court is that Congress did 
know how to say “aid” and “abet,” but found those words would be 
redundant if included in the statute.81  Professor Prentice argues that: 
[g]iven the state of the law in 1934, a Congress wishing to impose 
liability upon defendants who aided[,] or aided and abetted[,] securities 
fraud would most probably not have included a specific provision for 
aiding and abetting.  While Congress could have done so, of course, it 
would not have deemed such action necessary or natural because in 1934 
all who knowingly aided, abetted, counseled, approved, procured, 
countenanced, commanded, or participated in common law or blue sky 
fraud in some other meaningful way would have been held fully liable as 
joint tortfeasors with no distinction drawn between primary and secondary 
liability.82 
The Central Bank Court, however, was concerned that allowing aiding and 
abetting liability would open up liability’s reach to parties who “do not 
engage in the proscribed activities at all, but who give a degree of aid to 
those who do.”83  Whether or not this purpose was served by the opinion is 
 
 75. Id. at 168. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See id. at 191. 
 78. Id. at 176. 
 79. Id. at 176-77 
 80. See Prentice, supra note 68, at 619-48 (analyzing the state of the law in the 1930s, 
concluding that Central Bank interpreted the law incorrectly). 
 81. See id. 
 82. Id. at 644. 
 83. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 176. 
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debatable.84  The Court’s holding that “[t]he absence of [Section] 10(b) 
aiding and abetting liability does not mean that secondary actors in the 
Securities markets are always free from liability under the securities 
Acts”85 left open the possibility for gatekeeper liability as a “primary 
violator,” so long as “all of the requirements for primary liability under 
Rule 10b-5 are met.”86  Essentially, then, gatekeepers could still be found 
liable “if their conduct is sufficiently pro-active that they can be 
characterized as a primary violator.”87  And, as a result of the Central Bank 
holding, a plaintiff is entitled to remedies for gatekeeper actions if she 
proves all the elements of Rule 10b-5, which include proving that the 
defendant: “(1) made a misstatement or omission; (2) of a material fact; (3) 
with scienter; (4) on which the plaintiff relied; (5) in connection with the 
purchase or sale of a security; and (6) the plaintiff’s reliance caused the 
plaintiff’s injury.”88 
Congress responded to the issues underlying Central Bank, and the 
Central Bank decision itself, by passing, over presidential veto,89 the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA).90  The PSLRA 
amended the ’34 Act by adding Section 20(e),91 and restored private aiding 
and abetting liability with the following language: 
Prosecution of Persons Who Aid And Abet Violations.—For purposes of 
any action brought by the Commission under paragraph (1) or (3) of 
section 21(d), any person that knowingly provides substantial assistance 
to another person in violation of a provision of this title, or of any rule or 
regulation issued under this title, shall be deemed to be in violation of 
such provision to the same extent as the person to whom such assistance 
is provided.92 
 
 84. Taylor, supra note 65, at 372 (“[T]he Court did not protect corporate gatekeepers 
from all liability.” (emphasis added)); cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., For Accountants, The Supreme 
Court’s Central Bank Decision is Likely to be The Victory That Wasn’t; For Lawyers, The 
Result is More Ambiguous, NAT’L L.J., July 11, 1994, at B4. 
 85. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 191. 
 86. Id. at 191 (emphasis in the original). 
 87. Taylor, supra note 65, at 372. 
 88. Taylor, supra note 65, at 372-73. 
 89. PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995—VETO MESSAGE FROM THE 
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO 104-150 (1995); see also, e.g., Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 §20(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2000). 
 90. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 104, 109 
Stat. 737, 757 (1995). 
 91. This section, as a general matter, substantially limited private securities actions and 
settlements. 
 92. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737, 
757 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §78t(e)). 
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The amendment explicitly permitted the SEC to bring aiding and abetting 
actions against gatekeepers but limited this right exclusively to the SEC.93  
Notably, this right was established only for “knowing” violations,94 
“reckless” violations were left out.95  To date, this provision has not been 
utilized frequently and there have not been a substantial number of cases 
brought under its authority.96 
The main legislative goal of the PSLRA itself, however, has been to rein 
in excessive or frivolous securities litigation.97  To that end, the PSLRA 
introduced a combination of “three separate mechanisms: raising the bar as 
to what constitutes securities fraud, empowering lead plaintiffs to rein in 
their lawyers in class actions, and requiring judges to sanction securities 
lawyers for frivolous litigation.”98  Thus the PSLRA brought dramatic 
reform to securities law, including heightened pleading standards,99 
restrictive lead plaintiff provisions,100 and other fundamental changes to the 
securities litigation process.  Although the main goals of the PSLRA were 
to curb excessive litigation, these goals were balanced with the goals of 
investor protection, indicating that Congress was seeking to strike a balance 
between allowing for the punishment of wrongdoers and keeping the 
judicial system from becoming a routine stop on the path of disgruntled 
investors. 
While the legislation brought about substantial reforms, some believe it 
did not go far enough.  In fact, President Clinton vetoed the bill, citing 
(among other factors) that he believed it was not expansive enough and did 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. 15 U.S.C. § 78(t)(e). 
 95. Id. 
 96. See, e.g., Transcript, The Fifth Driker Forum for Excellence in the Law Corporate 
Citizenship and the Law, November 8, 2004, Spencer M. Partrich Auditorium, Wayne State 
University Law School, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1015, 1060 (2005) (including commentary by 
Professor Cramton stating that “the SEC lacks the personnel or resources to go after law 
firms and has brought only a handful of cases over many years”). 
 97. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 104-369 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730.  
Empirically, however, it is difficult to determine whether the PSLRA has accomplished its 
goals.  In the first decade after its passage, the number of law suits filed has not gone down 
and the rate of dismissal of cases appears to be statistically unchanged. See Stephen J. Choi 
& Robert B. Thompson, Securities Litigation and Its Lawyers: Changes During the First 
Decade After the PSLRA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1489, 1496-98 (2006) (citing several studies 
reflecting this conclusion). 
 98. Choi & Thompson, supra note 97, at 1489, 1490-95. 
 99. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 101, 109 
Stat. 737, 737-49. 
 100. Id. 
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not create enough protection for the investors.101  Part of his expressed 
discontent was his concern for the exclusion of the private aiding and 
abetting cause of action.102  Thus the legal flux surrounding private aiding 
and abetting liability was only beginning.  Though the natural conclusion 
from the passage of this legislation is that “Congress enacted [the law] to 
strengthen investor protection from its post-Central Bank state, not to 
weaken it,”103 and the view of the legislature and executive was that more 
liability was necessary under our securities laws than existed before 1995. 
D. Enron and Sarbanes-Oxley 
Despite the strides that the PSLRA made to protect investors and 
improve securities laws, it soon became apparent that additional reform 
was necessary.  In 2002, in the wake of the infamous Enron scandal, 
Congress passed the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor 
Protection Act of 2002, which was sponsored by Senator Sarbanes and 
Representative Oxley (“SOX” or the “Sarbanes-Oxley Act”).104  The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed primarily with an eye toward 
gatekeepers.105  SOX imposed a new set of requirements on corporations 
and their accounting firms, complete with an accounting oversight board, 
disciplinary rules, and reviews.106 
While SOX primarily targeted accountants, it also reached attorneys.107  
The reason for including attorneys in the law is apparent from 
 
 101. President Clinton pointed out that he was not “willing to sign legislation that will 
have the effect of closing the courthouse door on investors who have legitimate claims.  
Those who are the victims of fraud should have recourse in our courts.” PRIVATE SECURITIES 
LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995—VETO MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED 
STATES, H.R. DOC. NO 104-150, at 1 (1995). 
 102. In his veto, President Clinton wrote, “I made clear my willingness to support the bill 
passed by the Senate with appropriate ‘safe harbor’ language, even though it did not include 
certain provisions that I favor—such as enhanced provisions with respect to joint and 
several liability, aider and abettor liability, and statute of limitations.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 103. Prentice, supra note 68, at 651. 
 104. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 105. Taylor, supra note 65, at 379 (“There is no doubt that one of the purposes of SOX is 
to enhance gatekeeper liability.”). 
 106. SOX created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board  (PCAOB), a new 
entity created for the purpose of preventing “future Enrons,” given broad regulatory and 
enforcements powers by Congress to facilitate that goal. Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 101, 102-
105, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211(a), 7213-15 (2000 & Supp. 2002). 
 107. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002) (defining its purpose as “setting 
forth minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing . . . before the 
[SEC]”). 
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congressional statements made during the passage of SOX.108  Senator Jon 
Corzine, who was previously a chief executive at Goldman Sachs, pointed 
out that executives and accountants routinely work with lawyers, which 
“means [that] when executives and accountants have been engaged in 
wrongdoing, there have been some other folks at the scene of the crime—
and generally they are lawyers.”109  The resulting Section 307 of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act,110 and Rule 205 promulgated under it,111 require 
attorneys to “report up” the corporate ladder any discovered violations.112  
Under the Rule, an attorney first has to report findings of misconduct to the 
chief legal counsel of the client, and in the event this person does not 
provide an “appropriate response” to the reported violation, the attorney 
must report further “up the ladder” to the company’s audit committee or 
another wholly independent committee, and finally to the board of 
directors; though, at this point, the lawyers may even report to the SEC.113 
In addition to the “reporting up and out” requirement, the SEC also 
implemented an alternative structure in Rule 205.  Instead of reporting up, 
an attorney could report violations to a Qualified Legal Compliance 
Committee (QLCC) if the particular corporation had established one.114  
The QLCC was designed to serve an independent committee function 
within the corporation, taking the investigation and monitoring of response 
to corporate fraud out of the busy hands of the attorneys, and placing it into 
the hands of an independent committee.115  Unlike the reporting up and out 
procedure, a report to the QLCC ends the reporting obligation of the 
lawyer, and eliminates the requirement that the reporting lawyers monitor 
the attention given to the report, as well as the need to report out.116  As a 
 
 108. See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. S6524 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statements of Sen. Enzi 
& Sen. Corzine). 
 109. 148 CONG. REC. S6524 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Corzine). 
 110. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245. 
 111. Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing Before 
the Commission in the Representation of an Issuer, 17 C.F.R. § 205 (2003). 
 112. Id. § 205.3. 
 113. Id.; see also Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002). 
 114. Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing Before 
the Commission in the Representation of an Issuer, 17 C.F.R. § 205.3. 
 115. The QLCC has to be created by the board of directors of the issuer, and composed of 
at least two independent directors and at least one audit committee member.  It has to be 
empowered to commence necessary investigations of misconduct and retain necessary 
experts; and report its findings to the audit committee, the board of directors, and officers. 
See id. § 205.2(k). 
 116. Id. § 205.3(c)(1). 
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result, a QLCC report relieves the attorney from his or her gatekeeper 
obligations.117 
The changes that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act brought about for attorneys 
were not uncontroversial.  The reporting-up requirement triggered much 
debate on its merits.118  The QLCC and its utility have also been criticized 
on several grounds, including its effectiveness and cost.119  Not the least of 
these criticisms was presented by attorneys representing corporations, who 
advised their clients against establishment of such committees.120  As a 
result, by September 2005, only “456 entities formed QLCCs.  Thus, 
97.5% of issuers have not . . . adopted this means of corporate governance . 
. . .”121  Putting the merit of these changes aside, SOX demonstrates 
congressional concern with attorneys’ role in securities fraud, and Section 
307 was a way to address those worries. 
E. The Supreme Court Weighs In Again: Stoneridge v. Scientific-
Atlanta 
Despite these legislative efforts, the key holding of Central Bank—the 
elimination of a private right of action for aiding and abetting—was 
unaffected.  Despite Central Bank, in civil actions courts still could (and 
did) find accountants, attorneys, and other secondary actors liable under the 
’34 Act’s provisions, but only if they were “primary participants” in the 
defrauding scheme.  The circuits split in defining that threshold term.122  
Courts came up with two ways of interpreting the term, namely the “bright 
 
 117. Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, The Qualified Legal Compliance Committee: 
Using the Attorney Conduct Rules to Restructure the Board of Directors, 53 DUKE L.J. 517, 
536 (2003) (“[Because the attorney can simply report evidence of misconduct to the QLCC] 
[t]he attorney is relieved of any obligation to consider the strength of the evidence, the 
seriousness of the misconduct, or the appropriateness of the issuer’s response.”). 
 118. See, e.g., Susan Saab Fortney, National Symposium on the Role of a Corporate 
Lawyer: Chicken Little Lives: The Anticipated and Actual Effect of Sarbanes-Oxley on 
Corporate Lawyers’ Conduct, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 61, 66 (2004); Susan P. Koniak, When the 
Hurlyburly’s Done: The Bar’s Struggle with the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1236, 1270-71 
(2003); Darlene M. Robertson & Anthony A. Tortora, Reporting Requirements for Lawyers 
under Sarbanes-Oxley: Has Congress Really Changed Anything?, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
785 (2003). 
 119. See, e.g., Fisch & Gentile, supra note 117, at 534-66. 
 120. See, e.g., Robert Eli Rosen, Resistances to Reforming Corporate Governance: The 
Diffusion of QLCCs, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1251, 1277-1304 (2005). 
 121. Id. at 1252.  For additional information on this statistic, as well as how it was 
calculated, see id. at 1258-61. 
 122. See COX ET AL., supra note 64 (discussing the different standards applied across the 
circuits). 
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line” and “substantial participation” tests.123  In addition, plaintiffs found a 
solution to the limited scope of liability by pleading a separate concept of 
“scheme liability,” which was embraced by the Ninth Circuit.  Scheme 
liability relied not on the idea of statements made by an attorney that the 
primary participant analysis rested on,124 but rather included as a primary 
violator anyone who “commit[s] a manipulative or deceptive act in 
furtherance of” a scheme to defraud.125 
In 2008 however, the Supreme Court decided Stoneridge Investment 
Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.,126 the majority opinion of which 
“has been characterized as the Roe v. Wade of securities law and the 
securities fraud case of the decade.”127  Stoneridge effectively rejected 
scheme liability,128 holding that for liability to attach there must be a 
statement or representation made by the defendant.129 
Unlike Central Bank, which did not involve a primary violator, 
Stoneridge had a clear violator in Charter Communications, Inc. 
 
 123.  The “bright line” test emerged as the majority rule, see Taylor, supra note 65, at 
373, and it requires that the gatekeeper “make” a false or misleading statement in order to 
qualify as a primary violator. See, e.g., Ziemba v. Cascade Int’l, Inc., 256 F.3d 1194, 1205 
(11th Cir. 2001); Wright v. Ernst  & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(“Anything short [of a misleading statement] is merely aiding and abetting . . . .”); Shapiro 
v. Cantor, 123 F.3d 717, 720-21 (2d Cir. 1997).  Practically, under the “bright line” test a 
gatekeeper could avoid liability by not making public statements. Taylor, supra note 65, at 
374 (“As long as actors remain behind the scenes, they cannot be characterized as primary 
actors and will not incur liability.”).  The alternative “substantial participation” test was 
pioneered by the Ninth Circuit and is the less restrictive of the two tests.  Under this test, the 
court looks at gatekeeper behavior to determine whether the gatekeeper has participated in a 
fraud in a “substantial” way. See, e.g., In re Software Toolworks Inc. Sec. Litig., 50 F.3d 
615, 628 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994); In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., 864 F. Supp. 960, 971 (C.D. Cal. 
1994).  In the words of the Sixth Circuit, what this means with respect to attorneys is that 
“while an attorney representing the seller in a securities transaction may not always be under 
an independent duty to volunteer information about the financial condition of his client, he 
assumes a duty to provide complete and non-misleading information with respect to subjects 
on which he undertakes to speak.” Rubin v. Schottenstein, Zox & Dunn, 143 F.3d 263, 268 
(6th Cir. 1998).  The main difference between the tests is that under the “substantial 
participation” test, a gatekeeper need not be named or have any public statements attributed 
to her, participating in the creation of misleading or false information is enough. See 
Howard v. Everex Sys., Inc., 228 F.3d 1057, 1061 n.5 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 124. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
 125. Simpson v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 452 F.3d 1040, 1048 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 126. 552 U.S. 148 (2008). 
 127. Prentice, supra note 68, at 612 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 128. See Albert J. Matricciani, Jr., Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-
Atlanta, Inc.: Substitution of Congressional Intent With Caveat Emptor, 4 J. BUS. & TECH. 
L. 187, 190 (2009) (“The Court also rejected the application of the ‘scheme liability’ theory, 
concluding that reliance based on that theory lacks authority.”). 
 129. 552 U.S. 148 (2008). 
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(“Charter”).  Charter was a cable television operator and had been 
consistently missing Wall Street expectations for cash flow and 
subscription growth.130  To combat that reality, Charter engaged in a 
variety of fraudulent activities in an attempt to meet Wall Street 
expectations.131  However, such fraudulent practices proved to be 
insufficient so Charter turned to Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola, the cable 
box suppliers for Charter (and the defendants in the Stoneridge action), to 
create a more elaborate scheme.132  The scheme involved an additional 
payment by Charter for each cable box, and in return Scientific-Atlanta and 
Motorola then purchased advertisements with Charter for the total amount 
of the premium.133  This allowed Charter, as a result of Scientific-Atlanta’s 
and Motorola’s voluntary participation in the scheme, to deceive its 
auditors and report the advertisement revenue as income.134  In striking 
down scheme liability, the Supreme Court held that the key inquiry is 
whether “any deceptive statement or act [on the part of the defendants had] 
the requisite proximate relation to the investors’ harm.”135  Because the 
plaintiffs in Stoneridge were unaware of the defendants’ identity during the 
fraud, proving reliance was impossible.136  The decision created a flurry of 
negative and positive reaction.137 
What the decision meant for attorneys remained an unanswered 
question, but it represented a step by the Court that eliminated at least one 
loophole for bringing actions against gatekeepers that remained after 
Central Bank.  In part as a response to this decision, Congress once again 
proposed an amendment to the ’34 Act, this time to explicitly reinstate a 
private right of action for aiding and abetting liability.138 
F. Recent Congressional Action 
On July 30, 2009, Senator Arlen Specter introduced in Congress S. 
1551, the “Liability for Aiding and Abetting Securities Violations Act of 
 
 130. Id. at 153. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at  153-54. 
 133. Id. at 154. 
 134. See id. at 153, 155. 
 135. Id. at 153, 158-59. 
 136. Id. at 153, 159. 
 137. Compare Franklin A. Gevurtz, Law Upside Down: A Critical Essay On Stoneridge 
Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 448 
(2009) (criticizing the decision), with Atkins, supra note 25, at 20 (celebrating Stoneridge as 
a great triumph). 
 138. Liability for Aiding and Abetting Securities Violations Act of 2009, S. 1551, 111th 
Cong. 
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2009.”139  The bill’s purpose is to reestablish a private right of action for 
aiding and abetting securities fraud.  If passed, S. 1551 would amend 
Section 20(e) of the ’34 Act to include language explicitly permitting a 
private right of action, as follows: 
PRIVATE CIVIL ACTIONS—For purposes of any private civil action 
implied under this title, any person that knowingly or recklessly provides 
substantial assistance to another person in violation of this title, or of any 
rule or regulation issued under this title, shall be deemed to be in violation 
of this title to the same extent as the person to whom such assistance is 
provided.140 
On September 17, 2009 a hearing on this bill was held before the 
Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs of the United States Senate Committee 
on the Judiciary.  In his opening remarks, Senator Patrick Leahy, the 
Chairman of the Committee, stated that the focus of the hearing was the 
Supreme Court misinterpreting congressional intent and the need to hold 
those who assist frauds accountable.141  Several prominent academics and 
legal practitioners testified, with the majority favoring the bill, and the 
testimony presented different views on both the pending legislation and 
aiding and abetting liability generally.  While the future of the legislation is 
unclear, its introduction and discussion in Congress indicates the 
importance of this issue and underscores the need to make room for private 
aiding and abetting liability in our securities laws. 
 
 139. Id.  The text of this bill has subsequently been introduced as part of other proposed 
legislation in both the House of Representatives and the Senate, which underscores the 
importance of this issue. See, e.g., Liability for Aiding and Abetting Securities Violations 
Act of 2010, H.R. 5042, 111th Cong.; Investors Rights and Corporate Accountability Act of 
2009, S. 2813, 111th Cong.  While this Note’s discussion focuses on S. 1551, the civil 
aiding and abetting liability provisions in these acts are virtually identical, and the passage 
of any of these bills would bring the same change to aiding and abetting liability law.  To be 
clear, this Note refers only to S. 1551 in discussing current congressional consideration of 
this issue because it was the first bill to introduce the issue and it is the only one, at the time 
of this Note’s publication, that has seen activity since being assigned to a committee. 
 140. Liability for Aiding and Abetting Securities Violations Act of 2009, S. 1551, 111th 
Cong. 
 141. The Liability for Aiding and Abetting Securities Violations Act of 2009: Hearing on 
S. 1551 Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th 
Cong. (2009) [hereinafter Hearing on S. 1551] (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chairman, 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm? 
id=4052&wit_id=2629. 
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II.  THE PARALLAX VIEW: TOO MUCH, OR NOT ENOUGH, LIABILITY 
ON LAWYERS IS A MATTER OF PERSPECTIVE 
As a result of the recent Stoneridge decision, financial scandals, and 
congressional action, private aiding and abetting liability and support for its 
merits have gained import.  This section surveys some of the different 
views that exist on both sides of the attorney liability debate, and how, or 
whether, it should attach to lawyers.  The proper outcome inevitably 
depends on one’s view of attorneys’ roles.  Part II.A reviews the arguments 
on the side favoring liability, usually espoused by academics, investors, and 
the legislature.  Part II.B analyzes the arguments usually made by bar 
associations, judges, and practicing lawyers142 for less liability, warning of 
the detrimental effects that aiding and abetting liability may have on 
attorneys. 
A. Arguments for Liability 
Dismissing an action against the law firm that represented Refco,143 
whose partner was later criminally convicted of securities fraud, United 
States District Judge Gerald Lynch noted that although the defendant firm 
was well aware of the “round-trip” transactions, he had no choice but to 
dismiss the case against the law firm in light of Central Bank and its 
progeny.144  In dicta, Judge Lynch expressed his true concern with the state 
of the law.  He wrote: 
It is perhaps dismaying that participants in a fraudulent scheme who may 
even have committed criminal acts are not answerable in damages to the 
victims of the fraud . . . .  While the impulse to protect professionals and 
other marginal actors who may too easily be drawn into securities 
litigation may well be sound, a bright line between principals and 
accomplices may not be appropriate.145 
Echoing that sentiment, during the hearing on the 2009 bill to reinstate 
aiding and abetting liability,146 Professor John Coffee pointed out in his 
 
 142. This siding is not surprising, as bar associations represent attorneys and not clients 
or investors. See, e.g., COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 51, at 103-04 (stating that “the 
legal profession continues to resist attempts to impose broader gatekeeping obligations on 
it”); Coffee, Can Lawyers Wear Blinders?, supra note 57, at 62 (“The bar associations’ 
efforts to insulate attorneys should not be surprising; after all, their constituency is 
attorneys, not clients.”). 
 143. See supra notes 1-11 and accompanying text. 
 144. In re Refco, Inc. Sec. Litig. (Refco II), 609 F. Supp. 2d 304, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 145. Id. at 318 n.15. 
 146. Liability for Aiding and Abetting Securities Violations Act of 2009, S. 1551, 111th 
Cong. 
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testimony that “it is anomalous that one could be criminally liable for 
aiding a securities law violation, but not civilly liable for the same conduct 
in a private suit.”147  Particularly because “gatekeepers are critical actors 
without whom many corporate and securities transactions cannot be 
completed unless they do give their approval . . . .”148  Several different 
theories are proposed in support of holding attorneys to stricter standards, 
which accompany and support reintroducing the private aiding and abetting 
liability claim. 
1. The Gatekeeper Argument 
The question on everyone’s lips after Enron, and really after many 
corporate or securities scandals, “where were the lawyers?” has an answer. 
149  Lawyers were there, but failed to play the role they were expected to 
play.  Indeed, “[l]aws and precedent intended to deter bad actions were 
plentiful at the time that Enron and WorldCom imploded . . . .”150  What 
was not in place was a deterrence system that ensured lawyers and other 
gatekeepers would fulfill their gatekeeping function.151  Several 
explanations for gatekeeper failure exist,152 but regardless of which 
explanation is accurate, gatekeepers are said to have become the weakest 
link in corporate governance during the 1990s.153  Supporters of aiding and 
abetting liability believe it is good practice, if not a necessity, to make 
certain that functioning laws exist to ensure gatekeepers’ effectiveness154 
because “[i]f there is no watchdog,” or no effective watchdog, “it cannot 
bark when the thief comes in the night.”155  Reinstating aiding and abetting 
liability makes gatekeepers more effective by increasing the likelihood of 
meaningful deterrence as well as investor confidence.  Furthermore, 
reintroducing such liability will add an additional set of monitors over 
 
 147. Hearing on S. 1551, supra note 141 (statement of John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf A. 
Berle Professor of Law, Columbia Law School), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/ 
pdf/09-09-17%20Coffee%20Testimony.pdf. 
 148. Id. at 4. 
 149. See Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 920 (D.D.C. 1990); 
Langevoort, supra note 15, at 76; Robertson, supra note 15, at 3. 
 150. Taylor, supra note 65, at 385. 
 151. COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 51, at 6 (stating that gatekeepers became the 
weakest link in corporate governance in the 1990s). 
 152. For a discussion of gatekeeper failure, see COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 51, at 
55-70.  Among the explanations for gatekeeper failure are the theory of decline in 
deterrence, increase in managerial pressure, and the market bubble theory. Id. at 55-56. 
 153. COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 51, at 7. 
 154. For a discussion of gatekeepers’ role, see supra Part I.A.2. 
 155. COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 51, at 34. 
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gatekeepers in the form of private actors, in addition to the finite resources 
of the SEC. 
But does the argument for stronger gatekeeper incentives necessarily 
reach lawyers?  A gatekeeper, once established in its role, has to be an 
independent professional.  Proponents of imposing aiding and abetting 
liability on attorneys argue that while other gatekeepers can certainly fulfill 
the gatekeeper role, attorneys are uniquely positioned because of the 
professional obligations imposed on them by the rules governing their 
conduct.156  Furthermore, attorneys “have reputational capital and are often 
in a position to block or delay transactions or governmental approvals that 
are vital to their corporate clients.”157  Attorneys’ roles are therefore critical 
not only because they can function as an additional gatekeeper,158 but also 
because of their legal qualifications and the role they have in document 
preparation.159 
A question of balancing attorneys’ dual roles—those of advocate and 
gatekeeper—complicates the gatekeeper argument for imposing private 
aiding and abetting liability.  Proponents of imposing liability on 
gatekeepers and attorneys counter these concerns by arguing that while 
attorneys have a duty to zealously represent their clients, corporate lawyers 
differ dramatically from litigators.160  This difference allows corporate 
attorneys to be well positioned to serve as gatekeepers both because of their 
role in corporate transactions and because they are not bound by the same 
adversarial structures as the litigators.161  Outside corporate lawyers are 
also unique gatekeepers, and cannot be replaced by the corporation’s in-
house counsel, because in-house attorneys are inherently more likely to feel 
 
 156. For a discussion of these professional obligations, see supra Part I.A. 
 157. John C. Coffee, Jr., Regulating the Lawyer: Past Efforts and Future Possibilities: 
The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1298 
(2003) [hereinafter Coffee, Attorney as Gatekeeper]. 
 158. Additional gatekeepers are necessary to increase the chance of overcoming 
situations where the corporation might try to conceal material evidence of fraud from 
gatekeepers. COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 51, at 34 (discussing how Enron 
intentionally kept independent gatekeepers at a distance). 
 159. “To commit most complex corporate frauds, companies need legal help.  The trick is 
to make everything look legitimate, and lawyers are critical to that task.” Koniak, supra note 
118, at 1239. 
 160. COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 51, at 193 (“In truth, the world of the corporate 
lawyer probably more closely borders on that of the accountant than that of the 
litigator/advocate.”). 
 161. For a discussion of the differences between corporate attorneys, litigators, and why 
the difference between them matters, see id. at 192-93. 
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beholden to, and constrained by, the corporation due to their role within its 
structure.162 
In addition to the outside corporate lawyer’s unique position in 
transactions, lawyers are also well equipped for their gatekeeper function 
because a set of rules already exists imposing ethical obligations on 
attorneys that are consistent with what should be expected from a 
gatekeeper.163  Stricter liability standards therefore do not interfere with the 
duties attorneys already face and would only improve attorneys’ 
functionality as gatekeepers, which has been weakening over the past 
decade.164 
2. The Deterrence Argument 
A closely related argument for restoring aiding and abetting liability 
concerns the increase in fraud deterrence which would result from 
increased liability.  Deterrence has recently been recognized as the only 
sound benefit of private litigation and the best rationale for securities class 
actions.165  Lawyers’ and other gatekeepers’ deterrent function is unique in 
that they find themselves as both the party to be deterred and the deterrent 
at the same time.  On the one hand, they need to be disincentivized from 
participating in frauds, yet on the other hand they need to be encouraged to 
take action to keep corporate fraud from occurring, even if in a minimal 
way. 
Deterrence in the gatekeeper context should be easier to implement.  
Unlike corporations, gatekeepers “can be more easily deterred than the 
primary violator because they do not stand to receive the same gain as the 
primary violator.”166  Consequently, if the prize is not as great as that of the 
primary violators the risk of losing one’s reputational capital by way of 
losing or being named in a private aiding and abetting suit may not be 
worthwhile.  Because gatekeepers effectively stand at the gate to the 
 
 162. Id. at 195; Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud: Re-Situating the Inside Counsel as 
Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 996-99 (2005) (“To understand why an inside 
lawyer makes unethical choices . . . ask her where she sits on the organizational chart . . . 
.”). 
 163. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 164. See COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 51, at 7. 
 165. See, e.g., Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The 
Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 103-04 (2005) 
(discussing extensive scholarship that indicates that private actions are recognized by the 
courts for their deterrent abilities, rather than as means for compensation or redress). 
 166. Hearing on S. 1551, supra note 141 (statement of John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf A. 
Berle Professor of Law, Columbia Law School), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/ 
pdf/09-09-17%20Coffee%20Testimony.pdf. 
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transaction and can prevent a potential harm even if the primary violators 
would want to proceed with a fraudulent transaction, deterring the 
gatekeepers from facilitating such conduct should deter the fraud as a 
whole.167  Thus the deterrence effect emerges.  And, “[a]lthough [such] 
private enforcement has its flaws, it is entrepreneurially motivated and thus 
will pursue secondary participants with predictable zeal.”168 
3. The Compensation Argument 
Another argument for reintroducing aiding and abetting liability is 
rooted in compensation theory.  Traditionally, private actions under Rule 
10b-5 aim to accomplish investor compensation, deterrence, or both.169  
The compensation argument is generally criticized, and the criticism is now 
widely embraced on the grounds that shareholders are not better off with 
private rights of action because such actions merely result in a form of 
pocket-shifting: although an investor is compensated, the payment in class 
actions under Rule 10b-5 often comes from the very pool of assets of which 
he or she is a shareholder.170 
Proponents of gatekeeper liability cite compensation as a clear 
possibility in actions against gatekeepers.  Because aiding and abetting 
actions do not target the company the investor is a shareholder of, or which 
has other shareholders that do not deserve to suffer as a result of the 
pocket-shifting problem, the resulting recovery would not come as a 
consequence of pocket-shifting, and therefore avoids the widely criticized 
pocket-shifting problem.171  Reinstating aiding and abetting liability for 
secondary actors is therefore said to allow shareholders to be truly 
compensated.  With aiding and abetting liability, investors would likewise 
 
 167. Id. (“[I]f the gatekeepers are adequately deterred, they will block transactions, even 
though the primary violator would willingly proceed with them.  Thus, to give these 
gatekeepers immunity from private liability is to abandon what logically is the most 
efficient technique for deterrence . . . .”). 
 168. Id. at 5. 
 169. See Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the 
Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 
1301, 1307-25 (2008) (tracing the history of 10b-5 and its purpose). 
 170. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on 
Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1558 (2006); Janet Cooper 
Alexander, Rethinking Damages In Securities Class Actions, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1487, 1503-
04 (1996). 
 171. Hearing on S. 1551, supra note 141 (statement of John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf A. 
Berle Professor of Law, Columbia Law School), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/ 
pdf/09-09-17%20Coffee%20Testimony.pdf (“Pocket-shifting wealth transfers do not occur.  
Thus, in a very real sense, recoveries from secondary participants uniquely provide 
compensation to shareholders, while recoveries from issuer corporations may seldom do 
so.”). 
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be compensated even if the corporation that was the primary perpetrator of 
fraud is unable to pay.172  Because gatekeepers would be exposed damages 
in cases where malfeasance or nonfeasance occurred, shareholders would 
be able to recover damages in cases where the corporation goes bankrupt, 
enters receivership, or faces other similar financial conditions that would 
render plaintiff recovery from the primary actor impossible. 
4. The Client Protection Argument 
Another argument in support of imposing aiding and abetting liability on 
gatekeepers stems from the understanding of who the lawyers’ client 
actually is in business transactions.173  Undoubtedly, the client is the 
corporation as a whole and not the independent management members or 
other individual agents.  This understanding makes it apparent that the 
imposition of aiding and abetting liability and measures a gatekeeper may 
take to avoid liability, such as disclosing suspicion of corporate fraud, in 
fact protect the company and can therefore be viewed as beneficial to the 
client.  Thus, the benefit of increased client protection is another reason for 
reintroducing the private aiding and abetting right of action. 
Within this understanding, client loyalty, in the sense of duties owed to 
the management (rather than the company as a whole), has to take the back 
seat; otherwise, “the lawyer [would be required] to remain silent in the face 
of conduct that was both unlawful and harmful to her organizational 
client.”174  Preventing lawyers from interfering to “prevent lawless harm to 
the client would affront all the values that give dignity to the professional 
role.”175  While this notion may not seem surprising, the attorney-client 
relationship can distort the perception of who the client is in the eyes of 
corporate attorneys.  Because it is generally the management that stands at 
the center of the relationship, it is the management who dictates the extent 
of business given to the lawyer.  Thus, the client in the day-to-day course 
of an attorney’s practice is the management, and not the faceless corporate 
entity.176  Reintroducing aiding and abetting liability would streamline the 
client protection that can get lost due to this practical attorney-client 
 
 172. For instance, investors of companies like Enron would have a viable course of 
recovery from actors who did not initiate the fraud, but who assisted it and did not take any 
actions to stop it. 
 173. Simon, supra note 38, at 1464-70 (discussing the concept of client loyalty and how 
that depends on the identity of the client). 
 174. Id. at 1468. 
 175. Id. 
 176. See supra Part III.A for a solution that should help avoid this problem. 
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dynamic and therefore carries great benefit to the organizational client as 
well as to the investors and the public. 
B. The Anti-Liability Side: “Clients [W]ant [C]hampions, [N]ot 
[C]haperones”177 
Those opposed to aiding and abetting liability tend to disagree that 
attorneys play a gatekeeper role, provide explanations for securities fraud 
that do not lend themselves to resolution through the implementation of 
aiding and abetting liability, or warn about potential consequences for 
attorneys that may outweigh the marginal benefits of liability.  For 
example, Peter Gruenberger, a partner from the New York law office of 
Weil, Gotshal & Manges, noted during a panel discussion at an American 
Bar Association’s symposium: 
Merely to be named in an SEC or private plaintiff proceeding often spells 
disaster (real or imagined) for the lawyer or firm involved.  Most lawyers, 
even more so than their clients, believe that the charge is never-forgotten 
headline news, that the rebuttal (his defense), if any, receives one-half a 
column on page 30, and that the retraction (even in the form of victory) 
gets a box at the bottom of page 56 (which no one reads).178 
In an area where client marketing is an endless cycle, either by way of 
results or direct marketing, a stain on a lawyer’s reputation can be very 
detrimental to that lawyer’s business and ability to act as the very 
gatekeeper, a result which proponents of such liability encourage.179  The 
sections below address the myriad of other reasons why attorney liability 
for aiding and abetting should not be restored. 
1. The Strict Reading of Statutory Text Argument 
The position of the Supreme Court is that the statutory language of 
Section 10(b) has never explicitly established aiding and abetting liability 
or even a private right of action.180  Congress knew how to write the 
language for such liability and could have created a section in the ’34 Act 
that would directly address the fate of aiders and abettors.  But Congress 
neither included a private right of action for aiding and abetting liability in 
 
 177. Coffee, Can Lawyers Wear Blinders?, supra note 57, at 73. 
 178. A.B.A., LAWYERS AND ACCOUNTANTS ON TRIAL: PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY 48 
(Charles H. Wilson & James R. Phelps eds., 1974). 
 179.  Painter & Duggan, supra note 34, at 179 (“Even a law suit that never results in a 
judgment can have a potentially ruinous effect on a lawyer’s reputation and career.”). 
 180. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008); 
Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 167-77 
(1994). 
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the original text of the law, nor amended the ’34 Act to explicitly impose 
such liability for private plaintiffs in the course of its many amendments to 
the Act.181  Private aiding and abetting liability is therefore a form of 
judicial activism which first expanded and then contracted the scope of 
such liability,182 until the Central Bank decision.  In response to the volume 
of such litigation, Central Bank ended aiding and abetting liability as a 
cause of action.183  Although counterarguments regarding the original 
intent of the drafters of the ’34 Act exist,184 the peculiar refusal to amend 
the ’34 Act to add a private right of action for aiding and abetting liability 
remains a steady reminder that Congress, for one reason or another, did not 
find such liability desirable. 
2. The Attorney-Client Privilege/Confidentiality Argument 
Attorney-client privilege and confidentiality concerns offer some of the 
biggest reasons to oppose aiding and abetting liability.185  If aiding and 
abetting liability was reestablished and an attorney’s only saving grace 
would be to make evidence of fraud public (either directly or through the 
SEC), the very goal of attorney-client privilege would be undermined, if 
not the privilege itself.186  Attorney-client privilege was created to facilitate 
communication between an attorney and client, allowing for an extra level 
of candor that would promote more thorough fact-gathering, efficiency, and 
better quality representation by the lawyer.187  The argument against 
imposing aiding and abetting liability on lawyers posits that if such liability 
were reestablished, clients would simply avoid disclosing certain 
information that the lawyer would be required or able to report.  This chill 
to the attorney-client conversation could lead to more difficult and less 
 
 181. Current attempts notwithstanding. See supra Part I.F. 
 182. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 169-70. 
 183. Id. at 177-78. 
 184. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 185. See, e.g., Attorney as Gatekeeper, supra note 157, at 1307 (“The most important 
argument against imposing gatekeeper obligations on securities attorneys is that attorneys 
may be less able to communicate freely with their clients.”); Robert A. Desilets, Jr., The 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the Securities Attorney: Confidentiality Confusion 
and the Need for Change, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 611, 612 (1994) (discussing confidentiality 
issues in attorney representations involving securities and calling for more protection of 
confidentiality rules); Katerina P. Lewinbuk, Let’s Sue All The Lawyers: The Rise of Claims 
Against Lawyers For Aiding and Abetting a Client’s Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 40 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 135, 170 (2008); Report of the New York City Bar Association Task Force on the 
Lawyer’s Role in Corporate Governance, 62 BUS. LAW. 427 (2007). 
 186. Attorney as Gatekeeper, supra note 157, at 1307. 
 187. See supra Part I.A.1 (discussing the privilege and the rules governing such 
attorneys’ confidentiality duties). 
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effective client representation, in addition to significantly less effective 
gatekeeper monitoring as it would be much harder for lawyers to detect and 
prevent fraud. 
3. The Floodgates of Litigation Argument 
Another key argument against reintroducing aiding and abetting liability 
involves the fear of flooding the court system with litigation.  Adding any 
cause of action typically poses this risk, and the prevalence of bounty-
hunter attorneys further increases the likelihood of this result.188  Concern 
over excessive litigation and abuse of the legal system was one of the key 
reasons for the passage of the PSLRA.189  Although the PSLRA addressed 
problems with stricter litigation rules and other processes, aiding and 
abetting liability could still carry with it a risk of, at a minimum, an 
increase in the number of filed complaints, even if the additional 
complaints do not evolve into actual lawsuits.  Allowing private aiding and 
abetting actions opens up the possibility of suits not only against every 
attorney or firm that represents a given primary actor, but also any and all 
other gatekeepers and other actors who may have aided and abetted the 
primary actors.  Consequently, many more actors could suffer the harm of 
being taken to court, and the court system itself could suffer from the 
burdens of this new litigation if aiding and abetting liability is restored 
without recognizing this concern. 
4. The Bubble Theory and Increased Costs for Gatekeeper Services 
Arguments 
Opponents of aiding and abetting liability argue that although gatekeeper 
failure may have occurred, it is explained by the market “bubble” theory, 
and that any such failure is self-correcting upon the end of the “bubble.”  
According to the theory, gatekeepers fall victim to so-called “market 
euphoria” and unwillingly lose their functionality during an economic 
“bubble.”190  For opponents of liability, the solution is largely to wait for 
the market to self-correct.  Although gatekeepers are more likely to fail 
during a “bubble,” after the “bubble” bursts, gatekeepers regain their power 
and therefore no external action to the general market activity is 
 
 188. See Hearing on S. 1551, supra note 141 (statement of Robert J. Giuffra, Jr., Partner, 
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/09-09-17%20 
Giuffra%20Testimony.pdf. 
 189. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 190. See Coffee, Understanding Enron, supra note 55. 
ADAMS_CHRISTENSEN 10/13/2010  6:50 PM 
2010] BREAKING PAST THE PARALLAX 983 
necessary.191  Gatekeepers’ return to serving their function is a natural 
product of the burst.  Consequently, for purposes of gatekeeper 
functionality, whether aiding and abetting liability exists is largely 
irrelevant.  Investors would not sue during a bubble, and attorneys would 
not be as vigilant as the law would like because they would not foresee the 
catastrophe they are supposed to prevent.  Because the harm is invisible, 
there would not be an impetus to protect the public against it. 
If aiding and abetting liability existed, however, gatekeeper liability 
would increase, and gatekeepers would seek to offset the cost of potential 
liability and risk by increasing their client fees.  Concurrently, increased 
liability could increase professional insurance costs, which would be 
passed on to clients in the form of higher fees.  There are those who argue 
that this is not true, however, because gatekeepers already build the cost of 
this risk into their fees due to already existing uncertainty regarding the 
scope of liability.192 
The many arguments that exist both for and against liability, offered by 
both those who view lawyers as gatekeepers and those that believe their 
role should focus on client representation rather than investor protection, 
present a number of factors to consider in determining what role a lawyer 
has to play and what changes, if any, must come to the legal landscape 
guiding their conduct. 
III.  IN SEARCH OF THE MIDDLE: WHAT ROLE SHOULD A LAWYER 
REALLY PLAY, AND WHAT LEVEL OF LIABILITY MEETS THE GOALS 
OF FAIRNESS? 
The medical profession’s rule of “first, do no harm” is perhaps one of 
the most well known professional principles, and one that is echoed in the 
Hippocratic Oath that all medical doctors practicing in the United States 
take.193  Although lawyers in this country do not take a similar ancient 
 
 191. See generally Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Remarks at the Stern 
School of Business, New York University: Corporate Governance (Mar. 26, 2002), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2002/200203262/default.htm. 
 192. Taylor, supra note 65, at 389 (“Under the current regime, gatekeepers face 
uncertainty as to their potential liability.  That uncertainty must be compensated for, 
meaning that gatekeepers already build that cost into their fees.”). 
 193. The text of the Hippocratic Oath itself does not include these precise words, but it 
does embody this maxim in its pledge to neither over-treat nor under-treat the patient.  For a 
discussion of the origin of the maxim, see Michael K. Gottlieb, Executions and Torture: The 
Consequences of Overriding Professional Ethics, 6 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 351, 
376 (2006). 
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pledge,194 they too enter their profession with a certain set of obligations 
implying that lawyers’ professional position will not be used to do harm.195  
Yet, most lawyers enter law school speaking about justice, but leave talking 
about jobs,196 and proceed in their careers talking about profits and 
successes.197  Corporate lawyers in particular are first and foremost in a 
fee-generating business.  In the course of their careers their focus shifts, 
perhaps justifiably, from their duties as officers of the court to the goal of 
achieving financial and professional success. 
Inevitably, due to their role in business transactions, corporate lawyers 
find themselves connected to almost all major frauds.198  However, as 
facilitators in most transactions,199 lawyers are also capable of being 
effective gatekeepers and could play a key role in stifling fraud, either 
through client counseling or disclosure.200  Furthermore, because many 
reforms at the corporate board level have already taken place, proposed 
solutions at this juncture should focus on gatekeepers, including lawyers, 
rather than their client companies.  In 2004, in a book stressing the need for 
greater gatekeeper monitoring, Professor John Coffee wrote that 
[n]o doubt further improvements [at the board level] are possible, but it is 
increasingly questionable whether any further movement in the direction 
of increased independence can improve firm performance. . . . [M]ost of 
what can conceivably be done to make the board more active and more 
independent has already been done.  Yet, independent boards proved 
 
 194. Unlike doctors, lawyers also do not face the same expectation of providing critical, 
quasi-social service.  Some states, however, have imposed oaths on their attorneys, requiring 
them to attest that they will counsel their client with the aim of promoting justice.  For  a 
discussion of this development, see Susan D. Carle, Lawyers’ Duty to Do Justice: A New 
Look at the History of the 1908 Canons, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 16-17 (1999). 
 195. See supra Part I.A.1 (discussing the ethical expectations imposed on lawyers). 
 196. Rhode & Paton, supra note 31, at 37. 
 197. In fact, law firms are ranked based on their profits-per-partner, rather than actual 
legal success, ethical accomplishments, or other statistics. See, e.g., Am Law 100, AM. LAW., 
May 1, 2009, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/tal/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id= 
1202430073120 (describing its firm ranking methodology, and listing firm profits and 
profits-per-partner as the focal criteria). 
 198. See supra Part II;  see also Rhode & Paton, supra note 31, at 9 (“[S]crutiny of 
lawyers’ conduct is equally critical.  Too many members of the legal profession were part of 
the [Enron] problem, rather than the solution.”); Simon, supra note 38, at 1453 (noting that 
lawyers have been major participants in recent corporate disclosure and tax evasion 
controversies). 
 199. See, e.g., Hearing on S. 1551, supra note 141 (testimony of John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia Law School), available at 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/09-09-17%20Coffee%20Testimony.pdf. 
 200. See supra Part II.A.1. 
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unable to detect or prevent the wave of financial irregularities that 
surfaced in 2000 to 2002.201 
With respect to gatekeepers, several systemic improvements are possible.  
Gatekeepers face less liability than they did before 1994,202 and one of the 
fundamental deterrents that keeps gatekeepers from participating in fraud—
protection of reputational capital—is believed to no longer function 
adequately.203 
Particularly in the legal profession, the dichotomy between firms’ and 
attorneys’ interests in client representation makes reputational capital 
protection less effective.204  Although firms do aim to protect their 
reputation and a loss of one client in the name of reputation would not be 
problematic to a firm, it is the individual partner responsible for the client, 
who is generally in the best position to know if anything fraudulent occurs 
and the one who suffers consequences if the fraud materializes.  To the 
individual attorney in the new, tournament-style firm structure,205 the loss 
of one big client could potentially spell career-ending consequences, 
creating a Hobson’s choice: the lawyer could report and lose both her job 
and the client; or, not report and potentially risk being implicated in the 
fraud and losing her job.206  Although signs of questionable client conduct 
may or may not result in fraud liability and loss of employment, reporting 
the client to authorities would most certainly result in losing that client to 
another firm.  With only one choice having certain devastating 
consequences, the decision not to report fraud becomes easier to 
understand.  But, if the fraud is discovered, and the client’s attorney is 
implicated, the consequences to this lawyer’s firm are less severe than to 
the individual lawyer.  Although these scandals are certainly detrimental to 
a firm’s practice, individual attorneys’ falls have historically been survived 
by their law firms without fatal damage to the firm’s reputation.207  Thus, 
 
 201. COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 51, at 7-8. 
 202. Gatekeeper liability all but ended in 1994 with the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Central Bank, which eliminated aiding and abetting liability. See supra Part I.C. 
 203. See, e.g., COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 51, at 7-8 (discussing gatekeepers’ 
position as the weakest link in fraud prevention). 
 204. Id. at 9. 
 205. For a discussion of law firms’ evolution towards tournament-style practice where 
competition and “eat what you kill” structure prevail, see generally MARC GALANTER & 
THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 
(Univ. of Chi. Press 1991). 
 206. See id. 
 207. The law firm involved in the Refco scandal still exists, and came out of the scandal 
virtually unscathed. In re Refco, Inc. Sec. Litig. (Refco II), 609 F. Supp. 2d 304 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009).  Additional firms that have survived big scandals include firms such as Vinson & 
Elkins LLP and Kirkland & Ellis, both of whom were advising parties involved in the Enron 
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to the extent that a firm’s survival is concerned, there is less incentive to 
create rules that would make attorneys more vigilant because the firm may 
have the option of distancing itself from the particular individual lawyer 
who allowed fraud to occur. 
Consequently, the goal is to find a balance where attorneys are not 
forced to forego their right to be good business people and generate profits, 
yet where their pursuit of these goals does not come at the expense of the 
public good.  A solution would have to encompass a dual set of rules: it 
would have to protect attorneys by providing meaningful avenues when 
they encounter possible fraud and sheltering them from being targets of 
litigation; it would also need to impose liability on those lawyers who 
choose not to take appropriate action.  Part III.A proposes a solution that 
takes account of these considerations.  Part III.B provides a survey of some 
of the suggested solutions that exist in the current literature and outlines 
how the proposed solution raises fewer concerns. 
A. Proposed Solution 
To address the complex set of problems that aiding and abetting liability 
presents, this Note proposes a statute amending the ’34 Act.  The proposed 
statute would reinstate a private right of action for aiding and abetting 
securities fraud and would direct the SEC to create a special Oversight and 
Review Committee (the “Committee”) for the purpose of investigating 
reported fraud.  The statute would also create a safe harbor for reporting 
gatekeepers, allowing for reports of evidence of fraud or material 
misrepresentation to the Committee, which would free the reporting person 
from aiding and abetting liability in civil actions. 
The proposed amendment would add the following provision to Section 
20(e) of the ’34 Act: 
PRIVATE CIVIL ACTIONS—For purposes of any private civil action 
implied under this title, any person who knowingly or recklessly provides 
substantial assistance to another person or persons in violation of this title, 
or in violation of any rule or regulation issued under this title, shall be 
 
scandal.  Another example is Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McLoy LLP, whose partner John 
Gellene was sentenced to a prison term following his representation of Bycurus in its 
bankruptcy which resulted in a scandal.  Milton C. Regan notes in the epilogue of his book 
on the plight of John Gellene that Milbank has become “one of the most profitable law firms 
in the country.” MILTON C. REGAN, JR., EAT WHAT YOU KILL 353 (Univ. of Mich. Press 
2004). 
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deemed to be in violation of this title to the same extent as the person to 
whom such assistance is provided.208 
(1) EXCEPTION—Any person who has made a good faith report of 
evidence of fraud or material misstatement or omission to the Oversight 
and Review Committee shall not be deemed in violation of this title for 
purposes of private civil actions.  This exception shall not apply to actions 
brought by the Commission209 and shall not be construed to apply to any 
other section under this title. 
The proposed statute should also contain a section creating the Committee 
and should include the following language: 
(a) OVERSIGHT AND REVIEW COMMITTEE—No later than 180 
days since the enactment of this Act, the Commission shall establish, in 
consultation with the American Bar Association, an Oversight and 
Review Committee, as described in this section, for the purpose of review 
and investigation of reported evidence of securities fraud, and shall 
promulgate rules governing reports of such evidence and Committee 
operation. 
(b) COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP—The Committee shall consist of five 
(5) members, appointed from among prominent individuals of integrity 
and reputation who have a demonstrated commitment to the interests of 
investors and the public.  The Commission shall appoint two (2) members 
independently, two (2) members in consultation with the American Bar 
Association, and one (1) member with consent of the four appointed 
members. 
(c) COMMITTEE DUTIES—The Committee shall— 
(1) conduct private investigations of reported evidence of fraud or 
material misstatements or omissions and shall— 
(A) inform reporting persons of results of Committee 
investigations conducted pursuant to  such reporting persons’ 
reports; 
(B) recommend any action or forbearance that the Committee 
deems appropriate to reporting persons as a result of the 
completed investigation; and 
 
 208. This language has already been brought for consideration before Congress as part of 
the Liability for Aiding and Abetting Securities Violations Act of 2009, S. 1551, 111th 
Cong., and other proposed bills. 
 209. This language is drafted to comply with the defined terms provision of the current 
’34 Act, which defines “Commission” as the Securities and Exchange Commission. 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 78(C)  (2006). 
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(C) report any findings of fraud or material misstatements or 
omissions, if such are made, for investigation and relevant action 
to the appropriate division of the Commission. 
(2) perform such other duties or functions as the Committee (or the 
Commission, by rule or order) determines necessary or appropriate to 
improve the quality of securities fraud investigation and prevention, 
or otherwise to carry out its duties, in order to protect investors or 
further the public interest. 
(d) COMMITTEE POWERS—The Commission shall grant the 
Committee all powers necessary to execute the Committee’s duties in 
accordance with this title. 
1. Strengths of the Proposal 
The proposed statute strikes a balance between two competing interests: 
protecting the investing public, and protecting attorneys210 from the 
floodgates of litigation.  The statute explicitly reinstates a private right of 
action, which serves the investing public by deterring gatekeeper 
participation in fraud and serves the attorneys by providing a safe harbor 
for reporting persons, shielding them from private aiding and abetting suits 
upon filing such a report.  To further the goal of improving investor 
protection, the proposed statute directs the SEC to create a special 
Oversight and Review Committee, whose purpose will be primarily to 
accept reports from attorneys and other gatekeepers211 and investigate their 
substance.  Law firms and lawyers need only report evidence of material 
misrepresentation or suspected fraud, allowing the Committee to focus on 
determining whether actual fraud has occurred, and whether a report to the 
SEC’s Enforcement Division is necessary.212  This structure recognizes the 
fact that fraud determination is often a difficult task, one that for 
gatekeepers may sometimes even be impossible.213 
The Committee is designed to be composed of members whose relevant 
experience would provide protection to both the investors’ and 
gatekeepers’ interests.  The SEC would be best suited to provide the 
 
 210. Although the discussion in this Note focuses primarily on attorneys, the proposed 
statute is drafted to encompass all potential aiders and abettors of securities fraud. 
 211. Such other gatekeepers may include, for example, auditors, accountants, brokers, 
and managers.  While the proposed statute is designed to focus primarily on lawyers, it is 
does not exclude reporting by other gatekeepers. 
 212. Although attorneys’ (or other gatekeepers’) obligations to the public would end 
when the report is made, the reporting party would be expected to cooperate to a reasonable 
extent with the Commission through the course of the investigation. 
 213. See Langevoort, supra note 15 (describing how attorneys can fall victim to cognitive 
blindness to their client’s indiscretion and be unable to discern red flags when they appear). 
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Committee with members familiar with fraud evaluation and the regulatory 
structure governing securities law, because of its experience with fraud 
investigation and prosecution and independence from any one class of 
gatekeepers.214  The American Bar Association’s role in nominating 
members to the Committee, in turn, is designed to provide members who 
have additional legal perspectives and different experience that SEC 
nominees may not have.  These members would be able to diversify the 
evaluation process and ensure that attorneys’ and other gatekeepers’ 
positions are recognized and taken into account during evaluations and 
recommendations made by the Committee.  Although members of other 
gatekeeper professions are not explicitly included in the statutory language, 
they are not prevented from serving on the Committee and could be 
selected by either the SEC or the ABA.  Because determining the presence 
or absence of fraud is primarily a legal question, there is less likely to be a 
need for the involvement of other professionals.  Members of other 
professions, however, are still likely to be involved in the work of the 
Committee when their expertise becomes necessary during particular 
evaluations. 
The proposed statute recognizes the risk of excessive litigation.  The 
proposed statute includes a safe harbor provision to address the possibility 
that restoring private aiding and abetting liability would increase frivolous 
or excessive law suits.  This provision provides that any party who has 
reported evidence of fraud or material misrepresentation to the Committee 
cannot be held liable for aiding and abetting securities fraud in private 
actions.  While the language may initially appear to be redundant, since any 
actor reporting fraud is unlikely to meet the statutory requirement for 
aiding and abetting liability, it is included to ensure that reporting parties 
avoid the harms that come with merely being named in a law suit.215  The 
statutory safe harbor is designed to eliminate the need for a legal battle at 
the motion to dismiss stage and function not only by shielding lawyers 
from liability, but also by saving them a trip to the courthouse. 
The proposal also makes the choice currently faced by attorneys less 
difficult.  Today, an attorney’s decision to report suspected fraud comes at 
the risk of breaching confidentiality and waiving attorney-client 
privilege.216  In the current system, when an attorney is wrong and the 
 
 214. COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 51, at 78 (pointing out the SEC’s reputation for 
being one of the most aggressive market regulators in the world). 
 215. See supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text. 
 216. See Lisa H. Nicholson, A Hobson’s Choice for Securities Lawyers in the Post-Enron 
Environment: Striking a Balance Between the Obligation of Client Loyalty and Market 
Gatekeeper, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 91, 129-36 (2002). 
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suspected fraud does not in fact rise to the level where disclosure is 
permitted, an attorney is not protected by professional rules.  The attorney 
may then face allegations of breaching confidentiality and waiving 
attorney-client privilege, which carry professional consequences.217  The 
proposed statute mitigates this risk. 
The Committee’s investigative role is designed to be confidential.  As 
such, any investigations the Committee carries out would be done 
privately.  The Committee would essentially be a de facto extension of the 
issuer’s counsel during the investigation.  The investigation would only be 
announced publicly if there are concrete findings of fraud, and at that point, 
the Committee would be required to report the fraud to the Enforcement 
Division of the SEC for investigation and prosecution, which, in turn, 
would cause the issuer to disclose the investigation in their public filings.  
This report from the Committee to the Enforcement Division does not 
contradict attorneys’ professional principles because such an outside report 
by the Committee would be made when a clear risk of economic harm 
emerges, and an attorney herself is permitted to report such findings.218  
But although the proposed statute seeks to protect confidentiality,  
confidentiality should not be an impediment to the imposition of liability as 
courts routinely imposed liability on attorneys for aiding and abetting 
before Central Bank without letting attorney-client privilege or 
confidentiality stand in the way or suffer.219 
The safe harbor provision and the proposed statute generally also do not 
make reporting mandatory.  A law firm has the choice not to report any 
evidence of fraud at all.  Although the law firm would then be exposed to 
liability in an amount unlimited by statute, it retains full control over its 
reporting and is free to use its own judgment as to what course of action is 
appropriate.  The statute merely encourages law firms to report evidence of 
fraud as such reporting would drastically reduce their liability exposure. 
In addition to protecting attorneys from harassing litigation, the importance 
of the safe harbor provision also lies in its incentive to monitor and report 
fraud.  By allowing attorneys to avoid private action suits, the safe harbor 
provision operates to encourage vigilant monitoring of clients and reporting 
to the Committee, which would displace the responsibility of fraud 
investigation by shifting it to the Committee.  Firms are likely to choose to 
report fraud because the benefits are so significant.  However, since a 
 
 217. See supra Part I.A.1. See generally Nicholson, supra note 216. 
 218. See supra Part I.A.1. See generally Nicholson, supra note 216, at 129-36. 
 219. See, e.g., Schiltz, supra note 59, at 83.  For a contrary view, highlighting the need 
for the preservation of attorney-client privilege, see generally Atkins, supra note 25; 
Desilets, supra note 185. 
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report to the Committee carries with it a heightened risk of disintegrating 
the client relationship, heightened monitoring and investigation of the 
client on the attorney’s part, along with perhaps a client discussion, will 
likely precede any such reports.  As a result, evidence of fraud would be 
analyzed more frequently on both the counsel and Committee levels by 
individuals with specialized knowledge.  More fraud would likely be 
detected at an earlier stage and more specialized determinations of fraud 
can be found.  Moreover, such frequent review should have some deterrent 
effect on the issuers as well because the increased likelihood of discovery 
should make it more difficult to engage in fraud. 
Consequently, the proposed statute grants to investors some recourse via 
private right of action against aiders and abettors, but not a carte blanche 
for litigation.  Concurrently, the proposed statute increases fraud detection 
and investor protection before there is any need for them to go to court. 
2. Weaknesses of the Proposal 
Like any solution, this proposal carries with it certain risks.  
Reintroducing a private right of action for aiding and abetting liability may 
lead to less representation or more expensive representation by lawyers in 
the type of transactions that could lead to liability.  Although the safe 
harbor provision is designed to counteract any such decrease in 
representation, it is plausible that some lawyers would rather forego 
practicing in this area than bear the higher monitoring and investigative 
burden.  However, this change is likely to, at most, return us to the pre-
Central Bank era’s representation and fees, which has not been reported as 
an era of scarce or overly expensive representation. 
Failure to report evidence of fraud to the Committee may marginally 
increase the costs of the fraud on the attorneys.  Under the proposed 
scheme, attorneys who knowingly aid and abet the fraud will not only face 
liability, but would also face increased reputational damages.  A firm is 
likely to suffer more from a law suit in a case where a safe harbor was 
available because the safe harbor functions as a safety mechanism, which 
would allow attorneys to report evidence or suspicion of fraud not 
sufficient to warrant open disclosure, or disclosure to the SEC’s 
Enforcement Division.  Because a report to the Committee carries few, if 
any, negative consequences to the reporting firm, failure to make such a 
report would raise questions about the firm’s involvement in the fraud and 
its judgment. 
The creation of the Committee and the reporting safe harbor provision 
could run the risk of failing to achieve the objectives of the proposal by 
simply failing to serve its function.  This could happen, for example, if 
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reports to the Committee occur, but the Committee does not detect the 
fraud any earlier than it would have been discovered otherwise.  This 
outcome would be particularly troubling because attorneys and other 
gatekeepers would have presumably satisfied the reporting condition and 
would be free from civil liability, but the fraud would play out nonetheless.  
Apart from a pessimistic disposition towards the SEC, predicting this 
consequence would also have to presuppose that the Committee would not 
in fact have the necessary tools to conduct these investigations effectively.  
The Committee, however, is purposefully designed to be established by the 
SEC, which retains a great deal of authority to restructure the Committee if 
necessary.  While it is possible that the Committee may not function 
flawlessly in the beginning, it is designed to be easily improved by 
additional SEC action and rules. 
There may also be concerns that the Committee might simply mirror the 
functions of the Enforcement Division, and therefore will not add any 
meaningful expertise beyond a second layer of investigation.  However, 
while the Enforcement Division operates on tips from the public and 
evidence it uncovers, the Committee would function in a more advisory 
capacity when the evidence of fraud is less certain and confidentiality is 
important.  Additionally, due to their confidential nature, investigations 
performed by the Committee, unlike investigations performed by the 
Enforcement Division, would not have to be reported by the issuers in their 
public filings.  The Committee would seek to capture reports of fraud 
before any substantial findings have been made, namely, in cases where the 
attorneys believe there is likely fraud, but their client either has not 
produced an explanation or has produced misleading explanations. 
Because Committee investigations are designed to be conducted 
privately and confidentially, there could also be some concern that 
investors would not have the means of discovering whether a law firm has 
made a report to the Committee.  Because even the mere naming of a firm 
or a lawyer in a suit bears consequences,220 ideally, the system would 
ensure that law suits against reporting law firms are stopped before they 
reach the courthouse and not merely at the motion to dismiss stage.  
Potential plaintiffs and the plaintiffs’ bar are likely to welcome such a 
system, as it would save them the costs of bringing an action.  The ability 
of the plaintiff to learn whether a report has been made would depend on 
when the plaintiff files suit.  Generally, a law suit is commenced either 
when the fraud has already been discovered or when the issuer’s stock 
experiences a suspicious drop, but no concrete evidence of fraud has yet 
 
 220. See supra Part II.B; see also supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text. 
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surfaced.  In the former cases, either an inquiry to the Committee or 
Enforcement Division, or even an inquiry with the issuer’s counsel itself, 
could be an available step to potential plaintiffs and may not be 
objectionable from the perspective of confidentiality.  The analysis in cases 
where investors want to sue on the basis of only a suspicious drop in stock 
price would be more complex.  Requests for information directed at the 
Committee or the would-be defendant gatekeeper would have to receive 
specialized treatment in order to preserve confidentiality. 
Another concern is that the proposed system would either create too 
much, or not enough, reporting.  With respect to over-reporting, lawyers 
and law firms may choose to avail themselves of the safe harbor provision 
both in cases of true fraud suspicion and in cases of merely possible 
misconduct to ensure maximum liability protection.  As a result, there is a 
possibility of overwhelming the Committee with irrelevant reports, making 
it less efficient.  Generally, over-reporting is unlikely to occur because any 
report to the Committee would carry with it a risk of terminating or 
straining the client relationship.  Consequently, a law firm is unlikely to 
risk such loss of business in cases where there is little or no evidence of 
misconduct.  The over-reporting problem can only occur if an industry-
wide practice of routine reporting emerges and the clients no longer have a 
choice to “counsel-shop” for law firms who would not make such routine 
reports.  But, even if the over-reporting problem was to emerge, the SEC 
can promulgate rules establishing threshold standards for reports, or other 
measures to cure the problem because the rules surrounding the 
Committee’s operation can be modified by the SEC.  Furthermore, as time 
goes on, the Committee is likely to become adept at recognizing which 
reports have merit and which reports are made as part of a firm’s routine 
practice, if such practices do emerge. 
A less likely, though possible, outcome would be under-reporting.  If 
routine, industry-wide over-reporting does not develop, firms face two risks 
in the proposed structure: the risk of liability exposure and the risk of 
losing the client to a firm that does not report.  Presuming that information 
on a firm’s Committee reporting practice becomes known,221 a firm with 
strict reporting practices is likely to have the same effect on clients as 
would reporting to the SEC in the system we have today.  A client would 
 
 221. This, however, is unlikely due to the confidential nature these reports would have, 
and the fact that these reports are designed primarily as a safe harbor for gatekeepers.  
Providing reporting statistics on particular law firms either by the firms or the Committee is 
likely to expose, or at least lead to deduction of, the identity of the corporations that are 
suspected by the gatekeepers of engaging in fraud.  This would go against the purpose of the 
reporting scheme. 
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simply prefer not to retain a firm with a reputation for frequent and/or 
unnecessary reporting.222  Thus, to attract the most clients, unless an 
industry-wide practice of routine reporting emerges, firms might be 
disincentivized to report evidence except where they believe the risk of 
exposure to aiding and abetting liability is high.  This, however, bears less 
consequence for the investing public because the private right of action will 
be available to investors to recover from any aiders and abettors.  But, on 
balance, under-reporting is unlikely both because of the liability shield that 
the safe harbor provision offers and the other related incentives such as 
decreased professional insurance premiums.223 
B. Existing Proposals 
Numerous proposed treatments of the gatekeeper liability issue exist, but 
they fall short of capturing all of the proposed statute’s advantages.  
Existing proposals include returning to the pre-Central Bank structure, 
reintroducing aiding and abetting liability but with concrete caps on 
plaintiff compensation, imposing stricter professional rules, as well as less 
radical solutions that might work within the current system, such as 
instituting a system where private actions are allowed, but only with SEC 
approval.224 
1. Return to pre-Central Bank 
One of the key proposals, both in its stand-alone form and as it functions 
in conjunction with other proposed measures, is a legislative re-
introduction of private aiding and abetting liability with language similar to 
that of the PSLRA.225  The bill currently pending in Congress embodies 
this view226 and proposes language substantially similar to the PSLRA.  
One of the key advantages of amending the ’34 Act in this manner and 
effectively returning to pre-Central Bank aiding and abetting law would be 
that lower courts have continued to use substantially the same phrasing in 
“articulating the elements of aiding and abetting under Section 10(b)”227 
 
 222. The client’s investors are likely to query such a choice, and themselves draw 
conclusions of suspiciousness in the corporation’s practice. 
 223. Some academics argue that if a disclosure requirement is accompanied by a statutory 
safe harbor for attorneys who comply with the requirement, professional insurance 
premiums would in fact go down. See Painter & Duggan, supra note 34, at 274. 
 224. See generally Rose, supra note 169. 
 225. Taylor, supra note 65, at 384-86. 
 226. Liability for Aiding and Abetting Securities Violations Act of 2009, S. 1551, 111th 
Cong. 
 227. Taylor, supra note 65, at 386 & n.113. 
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before Central Bank was decided.  As a result of this similarity in language, 
there would be sufficient precedent to adjudicate precise standards, 
eliminating the risk of uncertainty in judicial interpretation.228 
While this language alone may meet the needs of the investing public, it 
does not adequately protect gatekeepers from exposure to excessive 
litigation.  This Note adopts the statutory language currently considered by 
Congress229 and, therefore, captures the predictability advantage along with 
the additional benefit of restoring liability, but it also goes a step further.  
The statutory scheme proposed in this Note provides benefits beyond 
merely reintroducing aiding and abetting liability, as the proposed structure 
takes account of the risk of excessive litigation and protects gatekeepers 
from being exposed to unwarranted lawsuits. 
2. Restoring a Private Right of Action with a Cap on Liability 
Professor John Coffee230 expressed concern that restoring the private 
right of action would result in excessive damage awards during the 
Congressional committee hearing on the proposed bill to reinstate aiding 
and abetting liability.231  Professor Coffee recommended reinstating 
liability with a ceiling on damages for gatekeeper defendants so that 
gatekeepers’ liability exposure is tempered by something more than just 
proportional liability of Section 21D(f) of the ’34 Act.232  Professor Coffee 
provided a five-point list of reasons for such a ceiling on gatekeeper 
liability: (1) gatekeepers do not need to face multi-billion dollar liability 
exposure in light of their marginally small gains compared to primary 
defendants; (2) some gatekeepers are professionals in highly concentrated 
services and the failure of one firm could disrupt the markets; (3) a ceiling 
on liability would allow smaller firms to obtain liability insurance; (4) a 
limit on damages would avoid unfair susceptibility to collapse by firms due 
to acts of select individual members; and (5) such a cap would safeguard 
firms from extortion settlements under the threat of billion dollar 
liability.233  To serve these ends, Professor Coffee recommended that “[t]he 
 
 228. See id. at 386. 
 229. For the currently considered language, see Liability for Aiding and Abetting 
Securities Violations Act of 2009, S. 1551, 111th Cong. 
 230. Hearing on S. 1551, supra note 141 (statement of Professor John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia Law School), available at http://judiciary. 
senate.gov/pdf/09-09-17%20Coffee%20Testimony.pdf. 
 231. Id.  
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. at  9. 
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goal should be to devise a penalty that is sufficiently painful to deter, but 
not so large as to threaten insolvency.”234 
As a solution, Professor Coffee proposed a cap on liability in the amount 
of $2,000,000 for a natural person and $50,000,000 for a public 
company.235  Professor Coffee also suggested that companies’ liability 
should be subject to a percentage structure, with liability being either 10% 
or another percentage of (1) the defendant’s annual income over the last 
three years; (2) the defendant’s net worth as determined by its most recent 
audited financial statements; or (3) the defendant’s market capitalization at 
the end of its last fiscal year.236  This cap on liability would expose 
defendants in an aiding and abetting action to a potential damages award 
high enough “to induce the parties to settle for an amount beneath the 
ceiling,”237 but would not put them out of business. 
A different approach to capping liability was proposed by Professor 
Frank Partnoy.  Professor Partnoy suggested a liability cap based not on the 
revenue of the firm, but on proportional share of damages incurred by the 
plaintiffs.238  Professor Partnoy’s suggested approach would embody a 
strict liability scheme with the scope specified by the professionals in an 
agreement with the issuers, and a minimum specified percentage set forth 
by Congress.239 
While both versions of the cap ensure that private actions do not 
bankrupt the gatekeepers, there are certain advantages that this scheme 
does not capture which this Note’s proposal might successfully achieve.  
For instance, plaintiffs are unlikely to forego filing a suit merely because 
there is a cap on damage awards.  Thus, the number of law suits would not 
decrease.  Furthermore, although a cap on damages helps make sure that 
gatekeeper firms are not left in financial ruin, it does not provide any 
reputational protection to the gatekeepers, particularly those that may not 
have participated in the fraud and just fell victim to eager litigation.  This 
Note’s proposal, by contrast, works to encompass solutions to these 
problems. 
 
 234. Id. at 10. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. 
 238. See Frank Partnoy, Barbarians at the Gatekeepers?: A Proposal for a Modified 
Strict Liability Regime, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 491, 540 (2001) (proposing that gatekeepers face 
strict liability with proportional damages). 
 239. Id. 
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3. Professional Rules Solution 
A different proposed solution is to have a professional rule that would 
require lawyers to report misconduct.240  Such a rule has already been 
proposed by the American Bar Association but did not pass the vote.241  If 
reporting was mandatory, lawyers would presumably have no choice but to 
report evidence of fraud or material misrepresentation, and would take 
away the client’s opportunity to shop for more lenient counsel.242 This 
would not be a novel approach.  Both England and Canada place greater 
weight on a lawyer’s obligation as an officer of the court than the United 
States.243  However, although mandatory reporting could accomplish 
certain deterrence goals, it would only provide recourse through actions by 
the bar.  Furthermore, attorneys may or may not be able to determine that 
their client is engaging in fraud,244 making the reporting requirement a 
heavy burden to bear, particularly in light of the difficulty attorneys can 
face in evaluating client behavior.245  This Note’s proposal is superior to a 
professional rules solution because it places evaluation of possible fraud in 
expert hands, but leaves open the possibility of a private suit. Thus it is 
more capable of meeting the needs of both the attorneys and the investing 
public. 
4. Other Proposed Solutions 
Several other proposals exist.  One suggests that professional rules alone 
will not be sufficient to remedy gatekeeper failures, and that, at least as far 
as lawyers are concerned, there is a need to overhaul the incentive structure 
rather than merely impose rules.246  There is also a suggestion to create an 
 
 240. See generally DAVID LUBAN & DEBORAH L. RHODE, LEGAL ETHICS 359-65 (3d ed. 
2001). 
 241. Id. 
 242. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION 200 (2000). 
 243. Legal Profession Act, S.B.C. 1998, c. 9, s. 3 (Can.); LAW SOCIETY OF BRITISH 
COLUMBIA, PROF’L CONDUCT HANDBOOK, CANONS OF LEGAL ETHICS ch. 1 (2010); LAW 
SOCIETY OF UPPER CANADA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.01(1)(2), 4.06(1); CHRISTINE 
PARKER, JUST LAWYERS 88-95 (1999); Rhode & Paton, supra note 31, at 32 (citing 
Christopher J. Whelan, Ethical Conflicts in Legal Practice: Creating Professional 
Responsibility, 52 S.C. L. REV. 697, 700-02 (2001)). 
 244. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 245. Id. 
 246. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, Beyond Liability: Rewarding Effective 
Gatekeepers, 92 MINN. L. REV. 323-25 (2007) (discussing how psychology suggests that an 
incentive structure would be better than a liability structure at fostering effective 
gatekeeping); Rhode & Paton, supra note 31, at 25 (“[N]ew rules may not be sufficient to 
address root causes of the Enron problem if they fail to alter underlying reward structures.”). 
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accountability review board, similar to the one created for accounting 
professionals in the United States and Canada,247 to review questionable 
activity by lawyers.  Yet, another solution is to allow for a private right of 
action in cases approved by the SEC, by making the plaintiff seek the 
SEC’s approval in pursuit of lawsuits.248  Another proposal would allow 
actions against secondary actors, but require aiders and abettors to merely 
disgorge the profits made from the fraud.249  While all of these proposals 
might improve the current system if adopted, they do not strike the same 
balance between competing interests that this Note’s proposal is designed 
to achieve. 
Although there could be many ways to restructure the incentive system 
to encourage attorneys and other gatekeepers to better fulfill their 
obligation to the investing public, such a system may be more effective if 
liability remains part of the equation.  This Note’s proposal captures the 
incentive structure advantage but it also allows for an outside check on 
professionals who fail to report misconduct.  Although the predominant 
motivation for reporting is likely to be a firm’s desire to avoid liability, part 
of the incentive to report may be a form of reputational advantage that a 
firm may gain from a successfully thwarted fraud.  Certainly there can still 
be room for additional incentives, but they can work along with the 
proposed statutory scheme. 
The proposed independent review board may achieve similar results as 
the Committee, but there may be concerns in creating a review board 
similar to the PCAOB, in light of the constitutional issues that the PCAOB 
endured;250 in addition, a stand-alone entity would not have the benefits of 
the SEC’s expertise, resources, and monitoring.  Additionally, this solution 
would focus on mandating behavior rather than creating incentives for it.  
The proposal creates a structure within which attorneys are incentivized, 
but not required to make reports.  The ultimate decision of reporting or 
facing liability remains with them. 
Allowing for a private right of action only with the SEC’s permission 
would unduly burden the SEC, as many cases would have to be reviewed 
 
 247. Rhode & Paton, supra note 31, at 27-28 (suggesting that a review board created for 
attorneys, similar to the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) in the U.S. 
or the Canadian Public Accountability Board, could increase accountability in the legal 
profession). 
 248. In re Refco, Inc. Sec. Litig. (Refco II), 609 F. Supp. 2d 304, 319 n.15 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009); cf. Rose, supra note 169. 
 249. Hearing on S. 1551, supra note 141 (statement of Professor Adam C. Pritchard, 
Frances and George Skestos Professor of Law, University of Michigan), available at http:// 
judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/09-09-17%20Pritchard%20Testimony.pdf. 
 250. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010). 
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and either approved for filing or rejected.  By comparison, the system 
proposed in this Note only imposes the Committee’s functions on the SEC, 
and these burdens are unlikely to become extensive.  Because the 
Committee’s purpose is to evaluate evidence of fraud, rather than to serve 
as the clearing house for litigation, the Committee’s job would be limited to 
review of cases where a suspicion of fraud arises.  The number of such 
cases and the number of potential reporting persons is always going to be 
significantly smaller than the number of potential plaintiffs seeking to 
obtain permission to sue.  Furthermore, although such an alternative 
presents many of the same advantages that this Note’s proposal offers, such 
as a check on excessive litigation and gatekeeper protection from 
reputational harm, it does not capture the same deterrence advantages of 
this Note’s proposal. 
Lastly, allowing for mere disgorgement of profits, much like other 
liability cap alternatives, may not result in sufficient deterrence.  The risk 
of aiding and abetting a fraud would be limited to the profits derived from 
the transaction.  The possibility that the fraud would not be discovered, or 
discovered in time, may make aiding and abetting a fraud more likely.  The 
unlimited liability of this Note’s proposal, on the other hand, provides a 
stronger disincentive to aid and abet a fraud and is thus better suited for 
deterring gatekeeper misconduct. 
CONCLUSION 
Attorneys, by way of their professional status, are both counsel to their 
clients, owing a high degree of loyalty to the clients, and corporate 
gatekeepers, owing oversight duties to the investing public.  As officers of 
the court and members of an ethics driven profession, lawyers should not 
be required to pick which of these two roles to play.  Therefore, it is 
appropriate to impose on an attorney or law firm, a degree of responsibility 
for cases where the attorney’s unique professional position does harm.  
Restoring civil aiding and abetting liability would provide a check on 
attorneys assisting their clients’ misconduct.  This liability, however, 
should not exist in a form where it can be routinely used by investors as 
compensation for their losses. 
To protect attorneys from excessive litigation, while at the same time 
allowing investor recovery in cases where attorneys facilitated a fraud, this 
Note outlined a proposed statute that would reinstate a private right of 
action for aiding and abetting securities fraud with a reporting safe harbor 
provision.  The proposal reinstates aiding and abetting liability, allowing 
recourse to investors, but at the same time, creates a safe harbor provision 
that would allow attorneys to shield themselves from law suits.  The safe 
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harbor provision, if utilized, facilitates discovery of fraud and will help 
detect fraud in addition to safeguarding the lawyers.  Furthermore, because 
the proposed statute does not feature a cap on liability, attorneys will have 
an incentive to report evidence of fraud and will be deterred from assisting 
clients’ misconduct. 
